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ABSTRACT 
According to official statements, German Special Operations Forces (GER SOF) ensure 
that Germany has military options to cope with specific situations at a strategic level. The 
Bundeswehr, and thus GER SOF, must be capable meeting current tasks and expected 
future developments. This thesis evaluates the demands on GER SOF by conducting a 
defense mission analysis. The results are compared with the current GER SOF force 
structure and capabilities to determine whether sufficient forces are available to meet 
current requirements. Based on the findings, this thesis provides recommendations to 
close gaps between demands and current limitations of GER SOF. It further proposes an 
optimized organizational structure for GER SOF by using Mintzberg’s configurational 
theory to achieve greater internal coherence, and thus, greater effectiveness for current 
and future missions. 
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In the beginning of the nineteenth century, “small wars” were a part of state-on-
state conflict (also referred to as “Big Wars”). These small actions comprised the 
“security operations” to maintain lines of communication, conduct reconnaissance, 
limited defense actions such as protecting depots, lines of communication, and prisoners, 
and other limited offensive actions such as raids and ambushes. According to Karl von 
Decker, troops in small wars always operate at the tactical level, never at a strategic level. 
Small wars are part of big wars. Thus, a small war started and ended with the big war; a 
small war without a big war was not likely during this time.1 Specially trained 
conventional (light infantry) and unconventional (often indigenous) troops conducted 
these small wars, mostly with spontaneous actions. 
However, the world has changed dramatically in the last two centuries. Despite 
recent conventional state-on-state conflicts such as Operation Iraqi Freedom or current 
possible threats by North Korea or Iran, “big wars” are increasing less likely. Even if they 
occur, post-stabilization operations have become key due to globalization that can affect 
regional or even global security and stability. Globalization thus blurs national borders. 
The globalization of transportation, communication, and finance has 
benefited not only licit business but also professional criminals and 
terrorists. Arms dealers, drug traffickers, money launderers, human 
traffickers, terrorists, and other sundry criminals, enabled by new, 
affordable technologies, are increasingly organizing into sprawling global 
networks.2 
                                                 
1.. Karl von Decker, Der kleine Krieg im Geiste der neueren Kriegsführung (1828), Kesselring 
Publishing, LLC, September 2010. 
2. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-
Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think,” International Security 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008), 7–44. 
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Illicit networks, especially terrorist global networks, are seen as one of the most 
serious threats today. Scott Helfstein states: 
Violent extremism presents one of the greatest threats to the citizenry of 
the United States and its allies. It does not represent an existential threat 
[…], but committed individuals pursuing political change through 
violence remain the most likely to strike the homeland and its interests 
abroad.3 
Terror networks like Al Qaeda are able to recruit, sustain and operate 
transnationally. Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of countries where such terror and 
crime networks exist. Uprisings in Mali, Egypt, Libya or Syria provide additional 
evidence of such influence by terror-networks. “Small wars,” or limited military actions 
against such terroristic networks have become the focus of attention. Globalization has 
had an impact on how to fight new threats and to maintain stability and peace. The 
indirect approach has become strategic means to counter asymmetric threats.4 
A. STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and 
predictably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges 
a matador’s cape—only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much 
weaker opponent. While a conventional approach is instinctive, that 
behavior is self-defeating.5 
New challenges call for new considerations about military forces, their assigned 
tasks and structure. Most Western countries have reorganized their forces to cope with 
these new challenges. However, some political demands require operations that transcend 
abilities and capabilities of General Purpose Forces (GPF). GPF may be ineffective in 
cases where situational sensitiveness and political impact. Such operations, called special 
operations (SO), “differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political  
 
                                                 
3. Scott Helfstein, “Edges of Radicalization: Individuals, Networks and Ideas in Violent Extremism,” 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, West Point, New York, February 2012, 6. 
4. Jake Hartigan, “Why the Weak Win Wars: A Study of the Factors That Drive Strategy In 
Asymmetric Conflict” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
5. McChrystal, GEN Stanley A., and SGM Michael T. Hall, “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency 
Guidance,” Headquarters ISAF, 2009, 2. 
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risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, and dependence on detailed 
operational intelligence and indigenous assets. SO are conducted in all environments, but 
are particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments.”6  
Special operations offer two basic approaches. David Tucker and Christopher J. 
Lamb state that “SOF [Special Operations Forces] missions tend to align with the direct 
and indirect approach, and each approach requires some degree of specialization that 
align with SOF’s commando and warrior-diplomat skill sets.”7 Table 1 displays U.S. 
SOF missions in terms of approach: direct or indirect. 
 
Direct Indirect 
Counterterrorism Unconventional Warfare 
Counterproliferation Psychological Operations 
Direct Action Foreign Internal Defense 
Strategic Reconnaissance Civil Affairs 
Information Operations  
Table 1.   SOF Can Operate Directly or Indirectly.8 
Both authors also distinguish between independent SOF operations and SOF 
operations that support conventional military operations.9 Regarding the strategic value 
of SOF, they conclude that:  
In general, when SOF perform in an independent role they provide greater 
strategic value since they provide the primary effort [for conventional 
operations]. In a supporting role, SOF make a strategic contribution only 
to the extent that the conventional force operations depend upon SOF for 
success. If the overall conventional force campaign plan is critically 
 
                                                 
6. USSOCOM, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 Special Operations, April 18, 2011. 
7. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 155. 
8. Ibid., 153. 
9.Ibid., 158. 
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dependent upon SOF’s contribution, then SOF’s strategic value would be 
almost as high as when they perform independently, but this is almost 
never the case.10 
Special operations require forces, SOFs, who are “specially designated, 
organized, trained, and equipped.”11 Thus, “for SOF to be well prepared for indirect and 
direct missions, some SOF units must weight their training and equipment toward either 
the commando or warrior-diplomat skill sets.”12 According to Tucker and Lamb, the 
“SOF’s core commando and warrior-diplomat skills allow them to operate with 
discrimination in complex political-military environments that are inhospitable to 
conventional forces.”13  
Thus, Special Operations Forces are considered as strategic assets,14 “because of 
their ability to achieve political, military, psychological, and international objectives that 
represent the foundational instruments of national power,”15 as the NATO SOF Study 
(NSCC 2008) highlights.  
SOF, because of their adaptability, ingenuity, maturity, and organizational 
size (smaller organizations are more capable of rapid change), will remain 
the force of choice in a future environment characterized by a diffuse 
enemy, and ambiguous enemy command-and-control process, and an 
expanded array of enemy capabilities and methods of employment.16 
Failure in special operations is often equal to a loss of political reputation. If 
properly employed, SOFs can close the gap between contemporary political demands, 
and the limitations of GPFs. In order to avoid failure and eliminate shortcomings in the 
                                                 
10. Ibid., 158–159. 
11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-
3.5) (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), 1–1. 
12. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 155. 
13.  Ibid., 177. 
14. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-
3.5) (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), xiii. 
15. NATO Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Special Operations Forces Study [Nato SOF Study], (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2008), ii. 
16. Adrian Erckenbrack, “Transformation: Roles and Missions for ARSOF,” Special Warfare 15 
(December 2002), 2. 
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German (GER) SOF’s role as a strategic tool, continuous scrutiny of GER SOF’s 
structure is thus required. This thesis addresses the strategic utility of GER SOF and its 
organizational design for meeting German political demands and expectations.  
B. HISTORY OF GERMAN SPECIAL FORCES SINCE 1945 
In 1956, West Germany began to organize its new Armed Forces, which was now 
named the “Bundeswehr.” Plans already existed to create a maritime unit that was able to 
infiltrate an enemy’s territory by sea in order to establish a bridgehead for follow-on 
amphibious operations. Called “Kampfschwimmer” (KS) and with a force of 
approximately 60 men in total (operator and support), this company under the Navy’s 
command was established in 1958. These men were also trained in air and land 
infiltration tactics. Since 1972, the KS has had frequent personnel exchanges and training 
exercises with the U.S. Navy SEALs to improve mutual techniques, tactics and 
procedures.17 Unlike their U.S. counterparts, the KS are not designated to conduct covert 
operations or Hostage Release Operations (HRO). Moreover, as a military unit, they are 
not allowed to operate within Germany.18 
The Munich massacre during the 1972 Summer Olympics revealed that ad hoc 
formed police forces were not able to free the Israeli hostages taken by the Palestinian 
terror group known as Black September. Eventually, all the hostages were killed. That 
disaster required the establishment of an anti-terror unit that was able to conduct hostage 
rescue operations. Thus, the police unit “Grenzschutzgruppe 9” (GSG9) was founded. 
Five years later, in 1977, it successfully liberated all hostages from the captured airplane 
“Landshut” in Mogadishu.  
After the outbreak of major uprisings in Rwanda in 1994, rebels took eleven 
German hostages. Despite the existence of GSG9 and specially-trained military units like 
the “B1” paratroops companies19 and the Navy’s KS, Germany decided, after intense 
                                                 
17. Ingo Mathe, “Einsatzgruppe See der Kampfschwimmerkompanie—Unbekannte Fähigkeiten der 
Deutschen Marine,” Marineforum, 11-2011, 18. 
18. German Constitution, Article 87a. 
19. This situation can be seen as Germany’s first attempt in 1989/1990 to establish Army Special 
Forces within the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). 
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deliberations, not to use German forces to rescue German citizens. Instead, Belgian 
paratroopers eventually freed the Germans after a bloody fight. This lack of sovereign 
power resulted in initiatives to reconsider German (military) SOF. Consequently, the 
Army Special Unit “Kommando Spezialkräfte” (KSK) was founded in 1996. The KSK’s 
initial task was to rescue German hostages in environments which did not permit the use 
of regular military forces. 
Additional requirements expanded the missions of the KSK. In the Balkan War, 
the KSK was tasked to capture war criminals for trial before the International Criminal 
Court in Den Haag, Netherlands.20 In September 2001, the German government decided 
to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan with Special Forces and 
thus assigned the KSK to the mission. Placed under U.S. command, the KSK operated in 
Kandahar and Southern Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In the same year, 
General Klaus Reinhardt appealed before the German military high command that the 
KSK’s manning and structure were not sufficient for its assigned tasks and missions. 
Still, the KSK was involved in the Battle of Tora Bora, as well as Operation Anaconda, 
and were sent to conduct operations in Paktia in Eastern-Afghanistan. In 2006, authority 
over the KSK transferred to the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan 
(ISAF) SOF. Since then, the KSK has remained in Afghanistan under ISAF SOF 
command. The unit has challenges concerning additional tasks, such as partnering with 
the Afghan Police Response Units (PRC) and additional missions in Africa.  
With only four companies and one combat support company, the KSK has often 
lacked skilled operators. In 2005, an attempt was made to overcome this shortfall. The 
Navy’s KS unit became a part of the Bundeswehr’s SOF. Since then, Germany’s military 
SOF consists of two units, the Army’s KSK and the Navy’s KS. Also since deployments 
to Afghanistan, their mission now mainly focuses on maritime operations, such as with 
the European Naval Forces, Operation Atalanta, in the Gulf of Aden.  
                                                 
20. Examples are Milorad Krnojelac (Foca, 1998), Radomir Kovac (Foca, 1999), Janko Janijc (Foca, 
2000, KIA), and many more. 
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C. GER SOF’S IMPLEMENTATION IN THE BUNDESWEHR 
Bundeswehr’s Special Operations Forces are considered forces that are able to 
conduct tasks and missions of strategic importance. As an instrument of power, GER 
SOF ensure that the military has options to cope with specific situations.21 GER SOF are 
branches within the services. The German military high command, which is responsible 
for the Armed Forces’ organizational design, placed both units (KSK and KS) under a 
brigade-level command within the Army and Navy. Once assigned to a mission, 
operational control of the KSK and KS shifts to the command that is responsible to lead 
all German forces during missions abroad. 
GER SOF are deeply integrated into the Bundeswehr. Beginning at the strategic-
political level, the Federal Minister of Defense is the civilian head of the Bundeswehr. 
His subordinate is the General Inspector of the German Armed Forces (Chief of 
Defense). As a Four-Star General, he is part of the German Federal Ministry of Defense 
and represents the military-strategic level, and is therefore connected to the political 
level. He directs the different services: Army (HQ in Strausberg), Air Force (HQ in 
Berlin), Navy (HQ in Rostock), Central Medical Service (HQ in Koblenz), Armed Forces 
Combined Support (HQ in Bonn), and the Operational Command (HQ in Potsdam). 
Figure 1 displays the strategic and operational level of the Bundeswehr. 
 
                                                 
21. Deutsches Heer online.  
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Figure 1.  Strategic and Operational Level of the Bundeswehr.22 
 
Figure 2.  Army’s KSK Embedded in German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr).23 
                                                 
22. BMVg, “Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr,” Köllen-Druck Verlag GmbH, June 2012, 27; 
Ministry of Defense online, “Organisationsübersicht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung,” April 
2012, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWYBBg-
H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAkF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitIb2siv9bSMXRsHOsOZBg9tvyAQuzF9c!/. 




The Army’s KSK (as a brigade-equivalent, headed by a One-Star-General) is part 
of the “Division of Fast Forces,” and is one of three military divisions of the German 
Army (each headed by a Two-Star-General). This division is subordinate to a Lieutenant 
(Three-Star) General, the Inspector of the German Army (Figure 2). 
The Navy’s KS is equivalently embedded, as Figure 3 displays. Currently, the 
Kampfschwimmerkompanie transfers to the “Kommando Spezialkräfte Marine (KSK 
M).”24 Both SOF units are assigned to their respective services when not operationally 
deployed. 
 
Figure 3.  Navy’s KS Embedded in German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr).25 
                                                 
24. Y-Punkt online, “Im Wasser zu Hause,” http://www.y-punkt.de/. 
25. BMVg, “Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr,” 60. 
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Details of the KSK and KS are classified. However, official websites26 mention 
the Army’s KSK comprises approximately 1300 men. The KSK itself consists of four 
elements: mission element, support element, staff and a development section. The 
mission element is further divided into four mission companies, one combat support 
company and a training and test company. Each mission company has specific 
geographical and environmental divisions and associated means of insertion. Thus, 
platoons are divided by land, air, water, jungle, and arctic/mountain terrain. In addition, 
each company has a reconnaissance and sniper platoon. Only the mission element 
consists of operators who are specially selected, trained, and equipped. The Navy’s KS 
contribute approximately 150 sailors, consisting of a classified number of mission teams 
with approximately 12 to 16 men, a boat support group, a Special Operations Medical 
Support Team (SMOST), and a command, control, and support group.27 Effectively, they 
contribute to a company sized organization to GER SOF. 
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
To cope with globalization’s challenges for national and international security, the 
Bundeswehr was significantly restructured and reorganized in 2012. Although the use of 
SOF as an instrument of German security policy is going to become more important for 
German security and defense politics,28 the force strength, structure, and chain of 
command of GER SOF were not adequately structured.  
                                                 
26. Das Heer online. 
27. Kampfschwimmer online, http://www.kampfschwimmer.de. 
28. Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “Spezialkräfte der Bundeswehr: Strukturerfordernisse für den 
Auslandseinsatz,” SWP-Studie, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin, 
September 2007, 7. 
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1. Hypothesis and Research Question 
“The Bundeswehr must be enabled to meet current tasks and expected future 
developments.”29 Regarding its capabilities,  
the Bundeswehr must retain capabilities for operations across the entire 
intensity spectrum, including observer missions, advisory and training 
support as well as preventive security measures. Assets must be 
specifically put together for each mission, they must be quick to respond, 
flexible and modular and possess both escalation capability and 
robustness. Cohesion – operating as part of a system – is an essential 
prerequisite for success on operations and therefore a major determinant in 
the design of interfaces between organisational areas. Sustainability must 
be ensured for forces that are earmarked for enduring operations.30 
Despite such demands on the Bundeswehr and major adjustments in 2012, the 
expectations for GER SOF seem to be incongruent with its current structure. 
Accordingly, GER SOF’s strategic utility is questionable. That leads to the hypothesis: 
Gaps exist between German political demands and capabilities of German 
Special Operations Forces to fulfill such demands. 
This thesis is dedicated to examining the overall research question: 
“How can German Special Forces achieve greater internal coherence and thus 
greater organizational effectiveness for current and future missions?” 
This question requires that another question to be answered first: “Is the current 
organizational design congruent with current and future missions of the German Special 
Forces?” 
                                                 
29. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry 
of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 8. 
30. Ibid., 13. 
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2. Methodology  
Based on the assumption that gaps exist between political demands and the 
capabilities of GER SOF to fulfill such demands, this thesis begins with a defense 
mission analysis drawn from official guidelines, tasks and missions. First we focus on an 
analysis of German Defense papers that affect GER SOF. Then, threats and risks that 
influence GER SOF are analyzed. Next, specified and implied tasks for GER SOF that 
are necessary to accomplish GER SOF’s missions are highlighted. In each step, 
deductions and consequences for GER SOF are drawn. 
In a second step, the results of the first part are put side by side with the current 
GER SOF force structure to determine whether sufficient forces are available to meet 
current requirements. This comparison answers the supporting question: “Is the current 
organizational design congruent with current and future missions of the German Special 
Forces?” Our focus is on currently available assets and existing constraints that limit the 
use of GER SOF. Furthermore, critical facts and assumptions concerning current and 
future situations that affect GER SOF’s strategic utility are evaluated. This includes the 
question of the functionality of the current GER SOF’s structural configuration. The 
focus is on GER SOF’s organizational configuration according to Henry Mintzberg’s 
configurational theory. When comparing of both, the results of the mission analysis and 
GER SOF’s current force structure, will reveal whether gaps exist between German 
political demands and capabilities of GER SOF to fulfill such demands. 
Finally, the thesis concludes with a summary of findings to propose an optimized 
organizational structure for GER SOF to achieve greater internal coherence, and thus, 
greater effectiveness for current and future missions.  
3. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is on existing German and NATO doctrines, papers and 
assessments that directly or indirectly affect the employment of GER SOF as an 
instrument of power in support of Germany’s strategic interests.  
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4. Intent 
Since 2012, high-ranking German officers have demanded a new structure for 
GER SOF. In 2015, it may be possible to adopt a new structure for GER SOF. The intent 
of this thesis is to contribute to GER SOF reorganization with recommendations and a 
proposal for an adaptive GER SOF structure with greater internal coherence and thus 
greater organizational effectiveness for current and future missions. 
5. Translation 
If not otherwise noted, all translations from German to English are by the author. 
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II. DEFENSE MISSION ANALYSIS 
A. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT GERMAN AND NATO GUIDELINES 
1. Defense Policy Guidelines—Security Objectives and Interests, Intent, 
and Tasks and Missions for the Bundeswehr 
The basis for Germany’s security policy at the political-strategic level are detailed 
in the “Defence Policy Guidelines” of May 2011. It states that “[Germany’s] interests are 
not static, but can change in and along with international constellations and associated 
developments.”31 According to the policy guidelines, the current strategic security 
objectives and interests are as follows: 
 
Germany’s security objectives are: 
 The security and protection of German citizens; 
 The territorial integrity and sovereignty of Germany and its allies; 
 The fulfillment of international responsibilities. 
German security interests include: 
 Preventing, mitigating and managing crises and conflicts that endanger the security of 
Germany and its allies; 
 Advocating and implementing positions on foreign and security policy in an assertive and 
credible way; 
 Strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership; 
 Advocating the universality of human rights and principles of democracy, promoting 
global respect for international law and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor 
regions of the world; 
 Facilitating free and unrestricted world trade as well as free access to the high seas and to 
natural resources. 
Table 2.   Strategic Guidelines.32 
                                                 
31. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry 
of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 4. 
32. Ibid., 4–11. 
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“Ensuring security for our nation today means, above all, keeping the 
consequences of crises and conflicts at bay and taking an active part in their prevention 
and containment.”33 The policy guidelines emphasize that Germany’s responsibility to 
protect its citizens “goes beyond the borders of Germany,” especially in the case of 
“imminent danger abroad.34 
In addition, the guidelines acknowledge Germany’s responsibility in Europe and 
the world. It states clearly that the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) are fundamental for Germany’s 
security and defense policies. “Active participation in international and supranational 
organizations is of key importance for our [German] national security and also for our 
prosperity.”35 In doing so, Germany’s Armed Forces (the Bundeswehr) is one of its 
indispensible tools and also the centerpiece for Germany’s security and protection. 
Accordingly, the Bundeswehr is tasked with the following missions and its 
implied tasks (Table 3). 
                                                 
33. Ibid., 4. 
34. Ibid., 5. 
35. Ibid., 5–6. 
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Bundeswehr Missions: 
 Protect Germany and its citizens; 
 Secure Germany’s capability to act in the field of foreign policy; 
 Contribute to defense of allies; 
 Contribute to stability and partnership at an international level; 
 Support multinational cooperation and European integration 
Bundeswehr Tasks: 
 Territorial defense as collective defense within the North Atlantic Alliance; 
 International conflict prevention and crisis management – including countering 
international terrorism; 
 Participation in military tasks for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy; 
 Homeland security contributions, i.e., defense tasks on German territory as well as 
administrative assistance in case of natural disasters and large-scale accidents, for the 
protection of critical infrastructure and in cases of domestic emergency; 
 Rescue and evacuation operations including hostage rescue operations abroad; 
 Partnership and cooperation as a part of multinational integration and global security 
cooperation in the context of modern defense diplomacy; 
 Humanitarian relief abroad. 
Table 3.   Mission and Tasks of the Bundeswehr. 
Despite the fact that German “Armed Forces follow the changing objectives and 
interests of security policy, […] the Bundeswehr must be enabled to meet current tasks 
and expect future developments.”36 The guideline for the quality and scope for 
Germany’s military capabilities is a national level ambition that also frames 
Bundeswehr’s structure. Thus, the Bundeswehr must ensure: 
 The option of assuming command responsibility as a framework nation 
and 
 Providing the required capabilities for the entire task spectrum, into which 
the contribution of other nations can be integrated in a flexible synergetic 
manner37 
                                                 
36. Ibid., 8. 
37. Ibid., 10. 
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Under this lens, the Bundeswehr must be capable of meeting its prioritized 
objectives.38 Therefore, the following forces are required in the Bundeswehr: 
 forces for collective defense 
 forces to serve as a NATO Response Force 
 forces to contribute to an EU Battle Group 
 a set of forces for international conflict prevention and crisis management 
(UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) 
 force for evacuation and hostage rescue operations (HRO) 
 permanent capabilities provided for surveillance and policing of German 
air space and maritime waters as well as for search and rescue 
 forces for homeland security tasks 
As a general rule, Bundeswehr missions abroad are planned and conducted 
in cooperation with allies and partners within the UN, NATO and the EU. 
Evacuation and rescue operations are generally a matter of national 
responsibility.39  
What does this mean for GER SOF? To fulfill Germany’s ambitious security 
objectives with its armed forces, we draw the first deduction: 
Deduction 1: German Special Operations Forces must be properly manned, 
equipped and resourced to fulfill requirements of NATO, EU, international conflict 
prevention and crisis management, and for evacuation and hostage rescue operations in 
the same time to meet current political demands. 
Germany must be capable of employing GER SOF to at least four simultaneous 
missions. To illustrate this deduction, GER SOF must have sufficient forces to 
simultaneously contribute to a NATO operation like ISAF in Afghanistan and 
ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden, an EU operation in Africa like in the Congo in 2006, 
operations in Syria or Libya and a hostage rescue operation somewhere else. 
                                                 
38. Ibid., 10. 
39. Ibid., 11. 
 19
2. Current Missions and Tasks for German Special Forces 
According to the official website of the Bundeswehr, the current spectrum of 
German armed forces includes special tasks of strategic interest that cannot be fulfilled 
by GPF. These tasks require German Special Forces.40 These tasks are displayed in  
Table 4. 
 
Tasks for German Special Forces: 
 Rescue and release operations (HRO) of German and/or other hostages abroad as 
a requirement of national risk provision; 
 Capture of High Value Individuals (HVI) abroad, even against resistance; 
 Special Reconnaissance (SR) for the strategic and operational command; 
 Military Assistance (MA); 
 Offensive operations against subversive forces and terroristic threats (CT); 
 Protection of own forces and individuals in specific situations; 
 Seizing material concerning important interests, even under threat; 
 Missions against high-value targets of strategic/ operational interest; 
 Undercover/clandestine operations. 
Table 4.   Tasks Specified for German Special Forces.41 
As mentioned in the introduction, SOF are considered as a strategic asset to 
achieve high political or strategic goals. Accordingly, special operations must be 
commanded and controlled at the highest level to ensure operations remain synchronized 
with strategic intentions. In addition, the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special 
Operations (AJP-3.5) suggests that “C2 [command and control] of SOF should be 
executed within the SOF chain of command. In all cases, commanders exercising 
command authority over SOF should: [first] provide a clear and unambiguous chain of 
command, [and second] provide sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, 
                                                 
40. Deutsches Heer online. “KSK–einsatzbereit, jederzeit, weltweit.” 
41.Ibid. 
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and support the operations.”42 Despite the fact that AJP-3.5 is an unclassified NATO 
paper that cannot issue directives regarding Germany’s approach to establishing GER 
SOF’s chain of command, NATO provides the framework for Germany’s security 
considerations. “[…] The strategic requirements set by the North Atlantic Alliance and 
the European Union also have an impact on the form of military service, the task, scope, 
structure, equipment and organization of the armed forces.”43 Thus, current NATO 
doctrine should be taken into account. That leads to the second deduction: 
Deduction 2: GER SOF must be commanded and controlled at a strategic level 
with a clear and unambiguous chain of command that possesses sufficient experience and 
expertise to plan, conduct, and support special operations. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THREATS, RISKS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GER SOF 
“The process of globalization is affecting every state and society around the 
world. […] The global village is becoming reality.”44 Despite the positive effects of 
globalization, it “also involve[s] new risks that, to a differing degree, can have direct or 
indirect implications for the external and internal security of Germany and its citizens.”45 
The demands are clear: 
We have to respond to crisies and conflicts immediately where they occur 
and thus deny their negative impacts on Europe and our citizens.46 
1. Official Guidelines that Affect GER SOF 
Two documents are the basis for Germany’s strategic security strategy: the 
German “White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr,” and the “Defence Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests—
                                                 
42. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-
3.5) (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), 3–6. 
43. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense. “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry 
of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 9. 
44. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “White Papers 2006,” German Ministry of 
Defense, Berlin 2006, 17. 
45.Ibid. 
46. Franz Joseph Jung, former Federal Minister of the German Ministry of Defense, 23rd International 
Workshop on Global Security in Berlin, May 18, 2006. 
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Assuming International Responsibility—Shaping Security Together,” of May 2011. Both 
documents define Germany’s strategic security environment, risks and threats to 
Germany, as well as new challenges.47 The latter one, because it is more relevant to the 
present, will be used here. It contains key facts such as the following. 
 The weakness of failed states causes threats such as civil war, regional 
destabilization, humanitarian crises and related phenomena. Such 
phenomena are the radicalization and migration movements that support 
the creation of safe havens and retreats for terrorists and criminals. 
 International terrorism remains a major threat. “International terrorist 
groups and networks—often in combination with organized crime—pose 
an immediate threat that can have a wide range of implications for state 
and society.” 
 The misuse of advanced technology because of rapid distribution due to 
global interconnectedness poses a threat by state and non-state actors. 
Especially developments in information technology “have led to the 
almost instant, worldwide propagation of often unverified information. 
This gives extremists, too, numerous opportunities for disinformation and 
facilitates radicalization and destabilization.” 
 Attacks on critical information infrastructure (cyber attacks) “can also 
destabilize our state with serious repercussions for our national security.” 
Thus, the possibility of denying such cyber attacks becomes a strategic 
security issue. 
 The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and 
improvements in their means of delivery are increasingly becoming a 
threat for Germany.” In order to protect German citizens, Germany 
requires “credible deterrence, an effective non-proliferation regime, and 
effective early warning and defence measures to limit the options” of state 
and non-state actors from illegally acquiring WMD. 
 Disruption of trade routes and the flow of raw materials and 
commodities “pose a threat to security and prosperity. Thus, the protection 
of transportation and energy security becomes increasingly important for 
Germany’s security.” 
 Further potential risks are the dissemination of hazardous substances, 
epidemics and pandemics because of the effects of globalization and 
climate change that can lead to considerable conflict potential, i.e., 
because of future water scarcity in certain areas. 
                                                 
47. White Papers 2006, 14–15; Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “Defence Policy 
Guidelines,” German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 2–3. 
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2. Assessment and Deductions for GER SOF 
Assessments and deductions consider GER SOF’s given tasks. Impacts on the 
dissemination of hazardous substances, epidemics, and pandemics are not reviewed.  
Failed States. How can GER SOF contribute in tackling threats and risks caused 
by failed states? A failed state is characterized by: “a) loss of physical control of its 
territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein;  b) erosion of 
legitimate authority to make collective decisions; c) an inability to provide reasonable 
public services; and d) an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the 
international community.”48 The potential impact is high if one considers the current 
number of failed states.49 
Despite the weakness of such failed states, history provides evidence that those 
countries do have the chance to win wars against a much stronger opponent. Ivan 
Arreguin-Toft, in his book “How the Weak Win Wars,” examines 197 conflict outcomes 
between strong and weak actors in terms of their strategic approaches.50 It is assumed 
that the strong actor attacks the weak. The strategic approaches can be direct or indirect. 
“Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s 
capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight.”51 
Arreguin-Toft shows that “strong actors are more likely to win same approach 
interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions.”52 Even if same-approach 
interactions shorten the total time of conflict, indirect conflicts seem to be prolonged. 
“Opposite-approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victory for weak 
                                                 
48. Princeton University, “Failed State,” 
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Failed_state.html. 
49. Compare The Fund For Peace, “The Failed States Index 2013,” online, 
http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable. 
50. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 2011), 93–128. 
51. Ibid., 105. 
52.  Ibid., 128. 
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actors because the strong actor’s power advantage is deflected or dodged.”53 Such 
conflicts “tend to be protracted;” time favors weak actors. Thus, endurance matters. 
Arreguin-Toft offers the following findings: 
Same-approach interactions […] favor strong actors because they imply 
shared values, aims, and victory conditions. […] Opposite-approach 
interactions […] favor weak actors because they sacrifice values for time. 
This results in a significant delay between the commitment of armed 
forces and the attainment of objectives. Time then becomes the permissive 
condition for the operation of the political vulnerability [for strong 
actors].54 
 
  Weak-Actor Strategic Approach 
  Direct Indirect 
Strong-Actor 
Strategic Approach 
Direct Strong actorwins 
Weak actor 
wins 
Indirect Weak actorwins 
Strong actor 
wins 
Table 5.   Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes  
(Win Matrix).55 
According to Arreguin-Toft, a weak actor will lose a strong actor’s direct 
approach, if he counters also directly. That sounds logically because it is assumed that a 
strong actors armed forces and capacity to fight is much higher then it’s weak opponent. 
With weaker armed forces and capacity to fight, a weak actor should chose an indirect 
strategic approach. If it is not clear what the weak actor’s reaction will be, a strong actor 
should approach directly at first, because it is less time-intensive. But the strong actor 
should immediately switch to an indirect approach, if the weak actor responds indirectly. 
To win the war, a strong actor should have capabilities for both strategic approaches. 
                                                 
53. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 105. 
54. Ibid., 121–122. 
55. Ibid., 108. 
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Germany, however, can be seen as a strong actor because of its economical and political 
power in the world. As such, Germany contributes to stability and partnership at an 
international level (Bundeswehr mission). According to David Tucker and Christopher 
Lamb, Special Operations Forces can contribute perfectly to the indirect approach with 
their warrior-diplomat skill set. That leads to the following deduction: 
Deduction 3: GER SOF must have the capability to function in a warrior-diplomat 
role over the long run to support an indirect strategic approach. 
International Terrorism. According to Louise Richardson, terrorism is marked by 
seven crucial characteristics, including: 1)politically inspired; 2) involves violence or the 
threat of it; 3) is intended to send a message; 4) is of symbolic significance (act and 
victim); 5) is a tool of sub-state groups; 6) distinguishes between victim and audience; 
and 7) deliberately target civilians.56 International terrorism has global implications. To 
counter immediate threats posed by terrorists or terror networks, SOF first need to know 
who the terrorists are and what they are going to do. Thus, the focus is on individuals and 
networks hidden among the population, as well as their physical capacity to fight. 
Second, acts of terror occur without warning require a time-sensitive response. Third, 
acts of terror differ, and are rarely predictable. These characteristics require a highly 
flexible response force. Fourth, globalization, broadens the geographical range of 
terrorists. Hence, to be effective, SOF must also be able to act on a global range. Thus, 
we can deduce: 
Deduction 4: National-level intelligence must be provided to GER SOF. GER 
SOF also must have organic capabilities for special reconnaissance and political and 
strategic Intelligence to conduct quick response operations within GER SOF strategic 
task frame.  
Deduction 5: As a strategic tool, GER SOF must be capable of conducting time-
sensitive missions globally. 
                                                 
56. Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding The Enemy, Containing The Threat, 
(New York: Random House Paperbacks, 2007), 4–7. 
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Misuse of Advanced Technology. The spread of advanced technology demands 
two essential requirements for SOF. First, according to William McRaven, to keep up 
with any possible enemy, SOF must be resourced with “cutting edge technology” to 
achieve surprise and relative superiority. Second, to counter extremists’ opportunities for 
disinformation, SOF must have the capability to use information operations immediately 
for its own purposes. Third, McRaven asserts that SOF must achieve operations security 
to achieve surprise and to avoid mission compromise prior to its own actions.57  
Deduction 6: GER SOF must use advanced technologies to keep up with or create 
advantages over their enemies. 
Deduction 7: GER SOF must be able to conduct immediate information 
operations to undermine enemy capabilities and advantages. 
Deduction 8: GER SOF must achieve operations security (OPSEC) to protect 
information regarding own intentions and missions. 
Proliferation of WMD. SOF can contribute to disrupt the proliferation of WMD. 
Such sensitive tasks require a direct link to the high strategic command and control as 
well as special knowledge about WMD, which normally is not part of SOF training. The 
guidelines emphasize that Germany “must prevent state and non-state actors from 
illegally acquiring weapons of mass destruction.”58 This requires “[…] defence measures 
to limit the options of [rogue] actors.”59 If SOF is considered as a strategic tool that is 
able to conduct sensitive missions at the political level, then the next deduction is: 
Deduction 9: GER SOF must be prepared to conduct military operations to 
counter the proliferation of WMD. 
                                                 
57. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops. Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4–23. 
58. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense. “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry 
of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 9. 
59. Ibid., 9. 
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Attacks on Critical Infrastructure. The use of the military to protect Germany’s 
critical infrastructure is prohibited by law.60 However, cyber space is becoming more 
important and critical to Germany’s security; attackers often launch their strikes from 
other countries. That leads to the following deduction: 
Deduction 10: GER SOF should consider options for how to respond militarily 
against cyber attacks. 
Climate Change, Free Trade Routes, and Secure Supply of Raw Materials. These 
challenges for Germany are related to the section on failed states and terrorism. Climate 
change can cause regional instability that can affect Germany’s security, due to 
globalization. To support stability, SOF can contribute in its warrior-diplomat role. Free 
trade routes and a secure supply of raw materials require secure trade routes. SOF can 
counter piracy or sabotage of air transport, with direct action commando missions that 
eliminate such threats. Deduction 3, 4, and 5 cover these challenges. 
C. SPECIFIED, IMPLIED, AND ESSENTIAL TASKS FOR GER SOF 
In conducting the defense mission analysis, a look into GER SOF’s specified and 
implied tasks is necessary. “Specified tasks are those specifically assigned to a unit by its 
higher headquarters.”61 “Implied tasks are those that must be performed to accomplish a 
specified task, but which are not stated in the higher headquarters’ order.”62 Moreover, 
the U.S. Field Manual 101-5 also requires a proposal for essential tasks. Essential tasks 
are those “that must be executed to accomplish the mission.”63  
                                                 
60. German Constitution (Grundgesetz), §87a. 
61. U.S. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual No. 101-5: Staff Organization and 
Operations (FM 101-5). Washington, DC, 5–6. 
62. Ibid., 5-7. 
63.Ibid. 
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1. Specified Tasks 
Specified tasks for GER SOF are previously displayed in Table 4. They include 
direct actions for offensive operations, with a special focus on hostage rescue operations 
(HRO), which require the most advanced skills among all direct action missions. GER 
SOF’s tasks also require indirect actions, and hence the skills to conduct military 
assistance. Special reconnaissance requires both direct and indirect actions to gain 
intelligence. Both approaches also apply for covert operations. 
2. Implied Tasks 
NATO’s AJP-3.5 provides a broad background about NATO SOF’s principal 
tasks, as well as considerations about Command and Control, employment, and SOF 
planning for successful special operations. Case studies on four U.S. strategic special 
operations,64 done by Lucien Vandenbroucke, revealed the five following general 
patterns of special operations’ failure: “faulty intelligence, poor interagency and 
interservice cooperation, inadequate information and advice provided to decision makers, 
wishful thinking, and overcontrol of missions executed from afar.”65  
In addition, General Carl Stiner, the second Commander in Chief (CINC) of the 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which was newly created after the 
disaster of the Iranian Rescue Mission in 1979, has stated that, “the failure [of that 
mission] revealed serious shortcomings in the ability of the United States to equip, 
employ, and command special operations forces effectively in complex, high-risk 
operations.”66 “Key problems identified by General Stiner included the ad hoc nature of 
                                                 
64. The four cases are the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Sontay raid, the Mayaguez operation, and the Iran 
rescue missions (Desert One was known as Operation Eagle Claw). 
65. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3–8. 
66. General Stiner, briefing, March 1993, in Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding 
U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997), 72.  
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the task force, unclear command relationships, the lack of dedicated joint forces, and 
inadequate equipment.”67 
William H. McRaven, Commander of USSOCOM, determined that successful 
special operations (with an emphasis on the SOF’s commando role) need “relative 
superiority.”68 And “Relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking 
force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended 
enemy.”69 In his book, McRaven defines “three basic properties of relative superiority” 
as: 
• Relative superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement. 
• Once relative superiority is achieved, it must be sustained in order to 
guarantee victory. 
•  If relative superiority is lost, it is difficult to regain.70 
He further notes, “special operations forces, with their cutting-edge technology, 
access to national-level intelligence, high quality training, and elite troops, are able to 
minimize the frictions of war and achieve relative superiority.”71 According to him, six 
principles for successful special operations are necessary: “simplicity, security, repetition, 
surprise, speed, and purpose.”72  
From the list of GER SOF-specified tasks, and from personal observations about 
past special operations, the following implied tasks for GER SOF can be deducted (see 
Table 6). 
                                                 
67. Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997), 72. 
68. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops. Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and 
Practice (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4–23. 
69. Ibid., 4. 
70. Ibid., 4–8. 




Implied Tasks for A Successful Use of SOF Source 
Acquiring and maintaining SOF skills McRaven 
Providing national-level intelligence, including organic 
capabilities for “intelligence” 
AJP-3.5, Vandenbroucke, 
McRaven 
Smooth interagency, inter-service, and inner-service 
cooperation  
AJP-3.5, Vandenbroucke, 
McRaven, Gen Stiner 
Adequate Command and Control, Leadership and advice AJP-3.5, Vandenbroucke, 
McRaven
Operations Security AJP-3.5, McRaven 
Conducting Information Operations AJP-3.5 
Providing and use of advanced technologies McRaven 
Selection of SOF personnel McRaven 
Providing adequate combat and combat service support AJP-3.5, Gen Stiner 
Table 6.   Implied Tasks for Successful Use of SOF 
Some of these implied tasks overlap with previously drawn deductions, but are 
not fully discussed. For example, SOF skills shall be acquired and maintained. 
Additionally, training is most important to gain the skills necessary to accomplish SOF 
missions. Cross-training is also important and contributes to a flexible use of personnel. 
Finally, experience, acquired due to employments, is important to demonstrate 
capabilities as well as create a deterrent. 
Also, GER SOF must be able to conduct Information Operations (IO). In 
supporting Deduction 6, information operations are required for at least four reasons: 1) 
to counter enemy misinformation; 2) to influence the population within the area of 
operations to support its own missions and goals; 3) to inform the domestic population 
and political decision makers about SOF capabilities and limitations; and 4) IO 
contributes to deterrence. Quick and well-aimed information operations are essential 
because the enemy’s IO can undermine mission success, regardless of how well SOF 
have performed. 
Lastly, interagency, inter-service, and inner-service cooperation is probably one 
of the most challenging implied tasks for Special Operations Forces. This is especially 
true for HRO. “Deliberate HRO are complex multi-agency operations usually with a civil 
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governmental lead.”73 It requires an organizational design that permits quickly assembled 
task forces for specific purposes. As General Stiner mentioned, bureaucratic working 
methods led, among others, to the disaster of Desert One. A following subsection of this 
thesis is thus especially dedicated to this issue. 
However, two more deductions can be drawn from implied tasks for a successful 
use of SOF. 
Deduction 11: Capable personnel shall be carefully selected. A selection shall be 
effective for all personnel working within GER SOF’s community (including supporters 
and leadership). The selection process shall be adjusted to designated tasks. 
Special Operations Forces are elite forces. “Elite” in its sense means especially 
selected. Contrary to other elite forces, like specially trained and selected infantry, SOF 
are a tool even for sensitive strategic operations. A failure of a strategic operation has a 
much higher negative impact than an operational or tactical endeavor. But, as German 
saying goes, a chain is only as good as its weakest link. Thus, all personnel, including 
supporters and leadership, shall be especially selected to avoid mission failure of strategic 
special operations.  
Deduction 12: Adequate Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support 
(CSS)74 is necessary.  
Inadequate CS or CSS, especially in insertion75 and extraction,76 have a high 
impact on SOF mission’s success. For example, if Germany were not able to quickly 
                                                 
73. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-
3.5) (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), 2–4. 
74. FM 4-0, Combat Service Support, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 29 
August 2003, 1-1: The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all 
elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. […] It includes but is not limited to that support 
rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, 
and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their 
missions in combat. […]. 
75. Insertion: Placement of troops and equipment into an operational/ tactical area. The placement can 
be by airplanes, helicopters, vehicles, or vessels. The troops do not have direct control over these crafts. 
76. Extraction: Removal of troops and equipment out of an operational/ tactical area. The removal can 
be by airplanes, helicopters, vehicles, or vessels. The troops do not have direct control over these crafts. 
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provide airlift insert SOF anywhere in the world, Germany would surely not be able to 
conduct a hostage rescue operation as prescribed in the security guidelines. 
3. Essential Tasks 
What are essential tasks for GER SOF? Simple as it sounds, GER SOF have to 
provide capabilities to conduct missions across the full spectrum of special operations, on 
short notice and around the globe. This is required for GER SOF to meet existing 
demands and to be a strategic tool for political leaders. 
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III. IS THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
CONGRUENT WITH MISSIONS AND GOALS OF GERMAN 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES? 
The Bundeswehr must be enabled to meet current tasks and expected 
future developments.77 
 
Four years have passed since the German Federal Minister of Defense issued this 
requirement. From a German SOF’s perspective, it is time to conduct a mission analysis. 
Thus, this chapter will compare previously drawn deductions with GER SOF’s current 
situation to determine whether sufficient forces are available. Available assets and 
constraints for GER SOF are reviewed first, followed by critical facts and critical 
assumptions. Deductions from Chapter II are then compared with current force structure. 
The findings summarized in Chapters II and III, as well as current gaps, are also 
addressed in this chapter. 
A. AVAILABLE ASSETS, CAPABILITIES, AND CONSTRAINTS 
1. GER SOF’s Capabilities as Warrior-Diplomats  
Deduction 3 requires GER SOF to operate in a warrior-diplomat role. The two-
year basic training, and at least one year of advanced training within mission companies 
(KSK, KS or similar), do not provide the skills for being a warrior diplomat. Despite 
GER SOF’s use in military assistance missions, training clearly focuses on SOF’s 
commando role. Two foreign languages are required (i.e.,, French and English), both for 
multi-lateral missions. However, the language training is not routine. Also, there is 
limited education on culture or how to interact with indigenous people.78 Originally 
established as HRO forces, the prevailing mindset is commando oriented. Thus, there is a 
gap in GER SOF’s warrior-diplomat skills. 
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2. GER SOF’s Capability for Special Reconnaissance (SR) and 
Intelligence 
Deduction 4 demands that SOF must provide and maintain an intelligence 
capability for special operations. However, Army and Navy SOF units do not have 
organic specialized intelligence units (see Figures 2 and 3). Basic training includes 
surveillance and reconnaissance, but the focus is on direct action missions.79 The KSK’s 
mission companies are divided into land/desert, air infiltration, amphibious infiltration, 
mountain and arctic terrain, and sniper platoons. The Navy’s KS company specializes in 
underwater operations. However, special reconnaissance is implied in both units’ tasks, 
although there is no designated unit to conduct special reconnaissance or a department to 
process intelligence. As we will see later, a special reconnaissance, or a human 
intelligence unit, provides advantages for all special operations organizations. Without 
such a functional unit, intelligence-gaps can occur. 
3. Use of Advanced Technology—The Acquisition Process  
The capability to use advanced technologies and systems is vital for SOF to an 
advantage and to surprise the enemy (Deduction 6). GER SOF, however, do not have 
sufficient priority in the armed forces acquisition process. As we recall in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3, GER SOF units are integrated within the services. Any request for new 
technologies and acquisitions must be passed through the chain of command to Army or 
Navy Headquarters, respectively. This process calls for understanding, good will and a 
concerted effort to support GER SOF before the requests are forwarded to the Chief of 
Defense (General Inspector, GI), who is responsible for the armed forces’ readiness. The 
GI prioritizes incoming demands. He then calls in his Inspectors of the services and 
military as well as civilian leaders responsible for equipping the forces.80 According to 
Article 87b of the German Constitution, the civilian side of the Bundeswehr, the 
Bundeswehrverwaltung (Federal Administration for the German Armed Forces), is 
                                                 
79. Deutsches Heer online, 
http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/dso/!ut/p/c4/DcLBDYAwCADAWVwA_v7cQv0YaklLINRIq-
tr7nDHn9Mjhbo0J8MVt1Pm9EJlvo8cDbKwR4_OZuygoUAjklgeXvDSZfoAxIDOyA!!/. 
80. BMVg, “Customer Product Management (CPM), 2010, Verfahrensbestimmungen für die 
Bedarfsermittlung, Bedarfsdeckung und Nutzung in der Bundeswehr,” Bonn: June 23, .2010, 4. 
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responsible for military acquisition. In doing so, the Federal Office for Equipment, 
Information-Technology and Utilization (BAAINBw) is subordinate to the Ministry of 
Defense. BAAINBw’s main task is to develop, test, procure and implement military 
material.81 The process of development, design, production, and testing new military 
material often takes years.82 As an example, GER SOF requested SOF-capable 
helicopters for many years.83 Modified versions of the BO-105 (comparable to a MH-6 
Little Bird) and CH53 could close be used but are lack adequate radio systems, night-
flight capabilities and electronic defense systems. Due to such shortcomings, the use of 
BO-105 by SOF for missions is not approved.84 This year, BAAINBw and Eurocopter 
signed a contract to acquire fifteen Light Utility Helicopters for GER SOF. Delivery will 
start by the end of 2015 and will continue until 2017,85 almost twenty years after first 
request. This is not an isolated example, according to the Financial Times Germany. It is 
also true for weapons, night-vision goggles and other vital equipment.86 
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86. Financial Times Deutschland online, “Mängel bei der Bundeswehr: Elitesoldaten in 
Ausrüstungsnot,” August 9, 2012, http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:maengel-bei-der-bundeswehr-
elitesoldaten-in-ausruestungsnot/70073700.html. 
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GER Armed Forces are able to buy military equipment available on the market 
(ESB) to overcome shortcomings,  only if tasked with a mission or if deployed, and if the 
equipment is mission essential and not available in the Bundeswehr.87 Hundreds of 
millions of dollars were spent to get better equipment and technology over the last three 
years.88 Thus, the use of ESB is very restrictive and contains stringent criteria to avoid 
unnecessary. GER SOF is not an exception to this procedure. In conclusion, there is a 
huge gap between SOF requirements and the current GER SOF acquisition process to 
procure new equipment. 
4. Immediate Information Operations  
Deduction 7 calls for the capability to conduct information operations. The army 
and navy do not have IO units and lack this capability to plan and conduct IO. The only 
German military unit that is competent in this area is the “Zentrum Operative 
Information” (ZOpInfo), including the Battalion Operative Information 950, which is 
subordinate to the Armed Forces Combined Command (Streitkräftebasis).89 The chain of 
command approval is needed to get IO support and this necessitates a complex and time-
consuming process. Furthermore, the different services have their own doctrines on how 
to use Information Operations; support to SOF operations is not routine. Thus, GER SOF 
cannot effectively plan and execute information operations in a timely manner. 
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5. Adequate Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS)  
Deduction 12 associated with Deduction 5 requires GER SOF to have combat 
support and combat service support capabilities to execute independent and time-
sensitive operations at the strategic level. Current combat support and combat service 
support capabilities are marginal (Figures 2 and 3) and mission enablers must be 
requested from other services to support individual missions. Such enablers are not 
designed to, or intended to support, GER SOF. The Bundeswehr, however, follows its 
internal rotation system to provide supporting forces for missions. Hence, temporarily 
attached units can vary, which always requires new familiarization regarding common 
mindset; equipment; techniques, tactics and procedure (TTPs) and so forth. Also, it is 
highly questionable whether such requested enablers are quickly available, sustainable, or 
likely to meet SO OPSEC. 
Airlift is a severe problem for GER SOF, which do not have organic or designated 
airlift capabilities. SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), the strategic airlift program 
is marginal, international and executed by civilian contractors who use Russian AN-124-
100.90 At the operational level, Germany discontinued its air transportation command in 
June 2010. In its stead, the European Air Transport Command (EATC) in Eindhoven was 
founded that year and now is responsible to support German operational airlift (C-160). 
In both cases, requests for airlift have been required well in advance. Such outsourcing 
can negatively affect demands on OPSEC. For national operational airlift, Germany does 
not have any experience or doctrine to establish forward air refueling and rearming points 
(FARRPs). German airborne fire-support platforms are inadequate. German helicopters 
(EC665, Tiger) were designed as anti-tank helicopters rather than to support airlift and 
                                                 







fire-support for infantry. Helicopter weapon systems do not meets SOF requirements.91 
All of this leads to one conclusion: GER SOF is not properly supported. 
B. CRITICAL FACTS 
1. Elite Versus Equality  
There is little prioritization for support assets in the German Armed Forces; the 
principle of equality predominates. This principle is based on ethical, legal, political and 
social grounds. Equality is an ethical issue.92  According to Article 3 of the German 
Constitution all people are equal before the law. In military matters, however, this should 
not be the case. Today, German elite units of the Third Reich are seen as criminals that 
supported the National Socialist (NS) regime. Thus, the term “elite,” which is inherent in 
SOF, has a negative connotation among most civilian and military leaders. This mindset 
negatively influences decisions to support SOF. This condition must change. 
2. Command, Control, and Leadership  
In fact, the GER SOF’s command and control does not meet the needs of 
Deduction 2. At the strategic level, only a very small staff section (SE I 5, Figure 1) 
lacking command authority is responsible for Special Operations. In 2012, the Chief of 
Defense became part of the Ministry of Defense’s Directorate, and is thus the highest 
representative of the Bundeswehr and the military advisor for the federal minister.93 
Since then, three out of nine Directorate-Generals have been subordinate to him to fulfill 
the following tasks: Planning (Plg), Forces Policy (FüSK) and Strategy and Operations 
(SE). “SE I 5 Special Forces Operations and National Crisis Management” is part of SE I 
(Defense Intelligence) that is subordinate to the Directorate-General Strategy and 
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92. Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Jung, ZDv 10/1, “Innere Führung: Selbstverständnis und 
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93. Federal Minister of Defense, “Grundsätze für die Spitzengliederung, Unterstellungsverhältnisse 
und Führungsorganisation im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung und der Bundeswehr,” in BMVg, “Die 
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Operations (SE).94 Consequently, section SE I 5 can propose recommendations regarding 
Special Operations but does not have direct authority to issue directives. This situation 
results in an extended coordination chain and lengthy administrative processes. As part of 
the Ministry of Defense, the Chief of Defense can call in a military leadership council 
(Militärischer Führungsrat, MFR) consisting of the chiefs of the services and experts, if 
needed. This council contributes to the discussion of common issues of a fundamental 
nature.95 GER SOF, however, are not part of this council. 
The Inspectors of the services represent the operational level. They are not part of 
the Ministry of Defense.96 This is also true for Bundeswehr’s Operational Command, 
which is responsible to command and control all Bundeswehr’s missions abroad 
(including SO). Thus, during such missions, services do not have direct influence on 
SOF. Conversely, the Chief of the Operational Command is not able to issue directives to 
the Inspectors of the services because they are co-equals (Figure 1). However, as force 
providers, the army and navy are able to influence SOF indirectly due to SOF’s 
placement in their respective service (Figure 2, 3). This affects GER SOF’s armaments 
requests, personnel requirements, general equipment and supplies, training resources and 
facilities and budget. 
At the tactical level, GER SOF rely on GPF’s resources for missions. Adequate 
support requires much coordination, time and the willingness of the commanders to 
support SOF at each level of command. 
If GER SOF are assigned a mission, authority shifts to the department of Special 
Operations Command (KdoFOSK) of the Einsatzsatzführungskommando (EinsFüKdo, 
English: Operations Command). The KdoFOSK is subordinate to the Chief of the 
Operations Command, a Three-Star-General (Figure 4). This command is responsible for 
planning, leading and evaluating all missions of the Bundeswehr at the operational level, 
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GER SOF included. In fulfilling this task, the Operations Command passes mission 
requirements to the services to provide forces.97 Unlike conventional units, KSK and KS, 
have been constantly deployed for the last decade.  
 
Figure 4.  Transfer of Authority to GER Operations Command. 
The transfer of authority for conducting SO causes coordination challenges for 
GER SOF, the services, and KdoFOSK due to a lack of habitual relationships. 
Preparations for deployment remain the responsibility of the services. Hence, the army 
and navy (and within them KSK and KS) have to meet the Operations Command’s 
requirements regarding manning, training, operations security, equipment and support to 
assemble tailored and ready task force. Direct coordination between SOF force providers 
and KdoFOSK contributes to OPSEC, but bypasses Army and Navy Headquarters. The 
Operations Command requests non-organic SOF enablers and support from other 
services. At a designated point between departure from Germany and arrival in the target 
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area, the transfer of authority takes place.98 Until this point, authority is very fragmented, 
especially if assembled forces come from different branches and services. 
Special operations also require specialized leadership. “Well-integrated, high-
performing teams—those that ‘click’—never lose sight of their goals and are largely self-
[sufficient].”99 In fact, SOF seem to have their own character and style of leadership. 
Judith A. Ross states, “You [as a leader] can have all the procedures and processes in the 
world, but without trust, your virtual team or operation is going nowhere.”100 Trust 
results from good leadership and a reputation for excellence performance over time. Trust 
cannot come from improperly employed SOF. Experienced SO leaders are needed to 
make effective decisions about special operations. According to Phil Harkins, effective 
leaders:   
 [Define] clear goals or a vision of the future in accordance with overall 
organizational aims (the “big picture”) 
 [Create] blueprints for action to achieve those goals 
 [Use] language to build trust, encourage forward thinking and create 
energy within the team (“powerful conversations”) 
 [Get] the right people involved (“passionate champions”)101 
Does the current system produce adequate SOF leadership? The Bundeswehr’s 
personnel development system applies to GER SOF. Officers normally rotate between 
assignments after two to three years. Army and Navy SOF are only small branches within 
their services (Figures 2 and 3). Thus, the number of fully qualified SO officers is small 
compared to that of other branches (e.g., Army’s Infantry, Artillery). Moreover, these 
officers can leave the armed forces after twelve years of service. These situation can lead 
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to shortages of qualified higher-ranking SO leaders. As a result, personnel who are not 
qualified have been assigned to positions requiring SO expertise. It is highly questionable 
whether this practice can produce the institutional trust and operational excellence 
necessary for successful SO.  
In conclusion, GER SOF’s command and control does not meet Deduction 2. At 
strategic level, command and control over GER SOF does almost not exist. Further, it is 
too fragmented at both, the operational and tactical levels. Leadership and staff positions 
continue to be filled with people who do not have SOF experience. Thus, there is a gap 
between requirements and the current capabilities regarding command and control. 
3. Selection 
Contrary to Deduction 11, the selection process and “Kommando” or 
“Kampfschwimmer” basic training only affects applicants for operational units. If they 
pass both of these requirements, candidates become operators.102 According to the 
official website, applicants have to be physically fit, willing to operate in teams, willing 
to learn, psychologically resilient and strong-willed, stress-resistant, responsible-minded, 
discreet and live in socially-acceptable conditions.103 The common goal among 
applicants is becoming a member of an SOF unit. Selection tests their characteristics, 
basic training tests their skills. Thus, operators can identify with each other because of 
their selection and training experience. By contrast, non-operator military personnel are 
not specially selected nor trained. Staff and support personnel can be assigned by the 
Bundeswehr to SOF units against their individual. Occasionally, individuals volunteer to 
serve in SOF support units simply to be geographically close to their families. However, 
for high performance SO units, the whole “team” matters. It comes down to the simple 
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question, “Does the group you have assembled view itself as a team?”104 Paul 
Michelman quotes the vice president of a performance improvement company: 
Often, executives have recruited and promoted a number of executives, all 
with specific goals and objectives, […] whether these individuals see 
themselves as a team is another thing.’ Perhaps they have ‘non-
complementary’ goals and are encouraged to compete with each other for 
resources and recognition.105 
“Performance expectations—and the accountability measures that should ride 
shotgun with them—must be as clear as those governing behavior. This applies both to 
the team as a whole and to the individuals who make it up.”106 As a simple deduction, 
military personnel within GER SOF, who are not selected regarding their mindset and 
performance, may not contribute to the high performance and strategic utility of GER 
SOF. Thus, a performance gap can exist between personnel who have passed the 
necessary selection process and specialized training and those who have not. 
4. Operations Security 
The Army’s KSK, in contrast to the Navy’s KS, is located in Calw, approximately 
thirty kilometers southwest of Stuttgart, Germany. It is the only military base in that area. 
The base is about one square-kilometer with an additional one point five square-kilometer 
training area. It is visible from three sides. The Army’s KSK is the only unit at Calw. 
Military railroad and airport access do not exist. Thus, movement in and out of the base 
can be easily be spotted and connected with SO activities. Steady activities can create a 
pattern that can disguise intent. However, if one connects official news with increased 
SOF activities, one may be able to conclude that the GER SOF is involved. Thus, 
operational security for the mission is compromised. 
                                                 




5. Proliferation of WMD, and Possible Cyberattacks 
Proliferation of WMD, and possible cyberattacks on German infrastructure are 
considered as current and future threats to Germany’s national security. “Activities 
designed to secure, interdict, destroy, or assist [to] rendering safe […] chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are inherently complex, involve 
restrictive OPSEC procedures, and generally necessitate the employment of specially 
trained and equipped personnel.”107 On occasion, NATO defers such tasks to countries 
that possess such capabilities. “In-extremis, however, where specialized forces cannot be 
brought to bear in sufficient time to prevent the employment of CBRN weapons, or their 
immediate interdiction is required, the authority to utilize other NATO forces, to include 
NATO SOF, to capture, deter, secure or assist in the process of rendering safe CBRN 
weapons, facilities, and associated enemy forces might be sought.”108 For such an in-
extremis situation, GER SOF have to be prepared, even if there is no clear task for GER 
SOF to counter the proliferation of WMD. The same is true for countering cyberattacks. 
Without directives, GER SOF would probably not be able to consider or develop 
capabilities to counter such threats in a worst-case scenario. Thus, there is a gap between 
the possible use of GER SOF and the current capabilities of GER SOF in terms of 
Deduction 9 and Deduction 10. 
C. CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
A mission analysis not only focuses on hard facts, but also on critical 
assumptions. The U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5 defines assumptions as follows: 
Assumptions are suppositions about the current or future situation that are 
assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of 
necessary, but unavailable, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander 
and staff know about the situation. An assumption is appropriate if it 
meets the tests of validity and necessity.109 
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In doing a comparison between demands and the current capabilities of GER 
SOF, two critical assumptions have to be made because of the absence of clear facts. This 
section, thus, focuses on GER SOF’s force strength and GER SOF’s structural 
configuration. 
1. GER SOF’s Force Strength 
Deduction 1, which was identified in Chapter II, called for an adequate force 
strength that fulfills requirements for NATO, EU, UN and  national crisis management. 
Thus, there is a necessity for adequate manpower. To test this assumption, some simple 
arithmetic follows.  
The strength of GER SOF is approximately 1400 to 1500 soldiers, including 
operators, staff and supporters. The Bundeswehr limits deployments times to four and six 
months; non-deployment has dropped from twenty to twelve months. With a task force of 
120 soldiers, GER SOF thus theoretically needs 1440 men to fulfill the demands, as the 
following example shows: 
 
Mission Mission Rotation – according to current 
demands 
Total Personnel 
NATO 1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 
2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month) 
360 men 
EU 1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 
2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month) 
360 men 
UN 1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 
2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month) 
360 men 
DEU 1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 
2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month) 
360 men 
Total 12 Task Forces 1440 men 
Table 7.   Level of Ambition—GER SOF-Personnel Ratio. 
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However, this number ultimately means: 
 GER SOF’s task forces are limited to a maximum of 120 men  
 Current existing structures must be broken up (currently five existing 
mission companies vs. twelve needed task forces) 
 All task forces must provide all required SOF skills sustainably 
 All men within GER SOF must participate in rotations 
 All supporting services, including intelligence and command and control 
must be able to support four task forces at the same time abroad and at 
home for mission preparations 
The math may work, but the reality is different. The KSK with only four mission 
companies, one combat support company, one staff and supply company, one signal 
company and one medical center (Figure 2) plus the maritime KSK with its three mission 
platoons and small support elements (Figure 3) are not able to conduct four different 
missions over the long run. Five warrior companies (including the maritime KS 
company), with only limited support, cannot adequately conduct four long–term 
missions. Internals are classified, but it looks like a misfit. It appears clear that current 
requirements for GER SOF have exceeded capabilities. 
2. Analysis of German Special Operations Forces’ Structural 
Configuration 
Deduction 5 calls for time-sensitive, contingency missions of global scope. This 
requires quickly assembled professional forces with multiple skills and capabilities, able 
to accomplish a specific mission worldwide. The structural design of GER SOF should 
support such demands. As previously mentioned, the ad hoc nature of the U.S. task force 
sent to free the hostages in Iran in 1980 was one of the causes of failure. However, GER 
SOF are deeply integrated in existing service structures; since 2012, even high-ranking 
officers have demanded a new structure for GER SOF. Currently, GER SOF lacks the 
required capabilities to rapidly deploy for contingency operations because of its current 
organizational design. 
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To test its validity of Deduction 5, this section focuses on examining GER SOF’s 
environment and its organizational configuration according to Henry Mintzberg’s 
configurational theory. The analysis begins by introducing theories concerning the 
environment, configuration and uncertainty. The findings will help determine whether or 
not the current structure of the GER SOF is appropriate. 
“Organizations, like organisms, are open systems that require inputs (i.e., 
resources and information) that produce outputs. Their boundaries are open to the 
environment.”110 The throughput that produces the output involves interactions among 
organizational subsystems. Jay R. Galbraith describes subsystems in his Star Model, 
which include strategy, people, structure, rewards, and processes: 
The Star Model framework for organization design is the foundation on 
which a company bases its design choices. The framework consists of a 
series of design policies that are controllable by management and can 
influence employee behavior. The policies are the tools with which 
management must become skilled in order to shape the decisions and 
behaviors of their organizations effectively.111 
Figure 5 presents such an open systems model, based on McCaskey and 
Galbraith’s Star Model. GER SOF, as an organization, is an open system that interacts 
with its environment and follows certain policies. 
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Figure 5.  Open Systems Model. 
a. Clustering the Environment, Configurations, and Uncertainty 
Before we analyze GER SOF’s environmental fit, we must consider the 
environment of an organization, in general, to determine if its configuration is suitable for 
its environment and for the uncertainty within the environment. According to Richard L. 
Daft, “Organization environment is defined as all elements that exist outside the 
boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the 
organization.”112 To refine this definition, Mintzberg asserts, “The environment of the 
organization can vary in its degree of complexity, in how static or dynamic it is, in the 
diversity of its market and the hostility it contains for the organization.”113 A stable 
environment requires a mechanistic and bureaucratic structural design for an environment 
when the task does not change. However, the more unstable an organization’s 
environment becomes due to rapid changes in its environmental elements, the more the 
organization must be able to adapt, or become “organic.” A further classification is 
complexity. A task environment can be seen as simple, if no more than three to four 
similar external factors influence the organization. A centralized structure is the best fit 
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 49
for such an environment. If many diverse external factors interact with each other and 
influence the organization, a decentralized structure of the organization is the best fit for 
such a complex environment, all other things being equal. In addition, “organizations 
must cope and manage uncertainty to be effective.”114 
Uncertainty means that decision makers do not have sufficient information 
about environmental factors, and they have a difficult time predicting 
external changes. Uncertainty increases the risk of failure for 
organizational responses and makes it difficult to compute costs and 
probabilities associated with decision alternatives. Characteristics of the 
environmental domain that influence uncertainty are the extent to which 
the external domain is simple or complex and to which events are stable or 
unstable.115 
If uncertainty grows inside the organization’s environment, a shift of the 
organization’s design can occur to cope with new requirements. Mintzberg’s model, 
Figure 6, shows how the environment can be clustered and in which direction the 
organizational design must shift when uncertainty increases. Mintzberg then assigns a 
specific configuration of an organization’s structure to each cluster. He further 
characterizes each of his configurations,116 as shown in the overview in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Task Environment. 
b. Analysis of Environmental Sectors of GER SOF 
Next, it is necessary to review the environment in which GER SOF exists.  
The environment of an organization can be understood by analyzing its 
domain within external sectors. An organization’s domain is the chosen 
environmental field of action. […] Domain defines the organization’s 
niche and defines those external sectors with which the organization will 
interact to accomplish its goals.117  
Daft divides the environment into the general environment and the task 
environment. The general environment encompasses sectors that influence an 
organization’s daily operations only indirectly. Figure 7 shows how GER SOF are 
embedded within larger organizations. These organizations can be seen as layers that 
encompass the entire German political and military structure. 
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Figure 7.  General Environment of GER SOF. 
It seems that the layers in Figure 7 operate as buffers for GER SOF. 
However, as previously mentioned, these layers influence GER SOF indirectly. The 
German government, as we have seen, provides guidelines for the Ministry of Defense 
that divides these political guidelines into strategic guidelines for the German Armed 
Forces (Bundeswehr). Next, the high command of the Bundeswehr provides operational 
guidelines for the Bundeswehr itself that affect GER SOF, which was discussed 
previously. However, all three layers influence GER SOF also directly. “The task 
environment includes sectors with which the organization interacts directly and that have 
a direct impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its goals.”118 Environmental 
sectors that influence GER SOF should be reviewed. Table 8 displays the GER SOF’s 
domain, its field of action, in which external sectors interact with GER SOF. It also sets 
each sector into one cluster of Mintzberg’s environmental categories. A brief description 
of each environmental sector clarifies the clustering. 




Table 8.   Environmental Sectors of GER SOF. 
(1) Missions Worldwide. This major environmental sector is 
categorized as very unstable and very complex. It encompasses the enemy, terrain, 
infrastructure, degree of development, religion and culture, government and distance to 
Germany from a certain region or state. As long as GER SOF’s task is to operate 
worldwide, imagine the vast area with which GER SOF must cope. People, and thus, the 
enemy, differ because of their dissimilar education, cultural and religious background and 
behavior. The terrain and environment in which GER SOF must operate vary from 
underwater, amphibious conditions, arctic conditions, wooden flatlands and high 
mountains, deserts, jungles or urban terrains depending on the assigned mission. Time 
matters, especially for hostage release missions. Thus, teams must adapt immediately to 
cope with a rapidly changing situation on the ground and to handle many diverse 
interacting external factors that influence GER SOF’s mission. 
(2) Single Combat Action. This environmental sector is 
categorized as unstable but simple. It comprises all single actions to accomplish a mission 
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like insertion, actions at target, and extraction of a SOF mission element. For example, 
fights on the ground always follow the so-called golden rules of war, such as fire and 
movement, taking the initiative, use of intelligence, surprise and so forth. The “fog of 
war” can be lifted by using McRaven’s principles for a successful SO to achieve relative 
superiority for a SOF team.119 These serve to reduce the complexity. However, as long as 
circumstances cannot be predicted completely, environmental elements remain unstable.  
(3) Task Environment. This sector is considered stable and 
complex and encompasses GER SOF’s assigned tasks, as well as sub-tasks to accomplish 
a mission. As mentioned, GER SOF are trained for several core tasks. Hostage Rescue 
Operations, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Actions, Military Assistance and 
Unconventional Warfare. Certainly, not all operations are undertaken at the same time, 
but each is anchored in the operator’s standardized training. However, complexity 
increases when the circumstances of a specific mission are considered. Does it involve 
specialized infiltration, combat divers, mountain guides, free-fall jumpmasters, jungle or 
desert experts? Is combat support very important? For example, trained operators may be 
required for mechanical and explosive breaching, joint fire support, foreign weapons, 
sniping, medical or radio support. Alternatively, the mission may depend on experts in 
optronical or acoustical reconnaissance, dog teams, mini drones or heavy engineers. 
Nonetheless, the task environment for GER SOF in this sector remains the same, but, as 
demonstrated, the operators may face a very complex scenario. 
(4) Training. This environmental sector also is categorized as 
stable but complex. Driven by its tasks and missions, training for GER SOF’s operators is 
established to deal with its broad requirements. However, training areas, such as 
Germany, Norway, the United States and standard operating procedures (SOPs) remain 
the same over several months or years. 
(5) Intelligence Networks. This sector is considered unstable 
and complex. In this part of GER SOF’s environment, cooperation with domestic or 
foreign agencies at a classified level is critical and difficult even within Germany. More 
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complexity is added if GER SOF need to negotiate and cooperate with different countries 
that use their own classifications and intelligence systems. Additionally, every mission 
that requires information about a hostile environment can be considered unstable because 
of a lack of reliability from the source, especially in time-sensitive operations. Often, 
incoming information changes quickly, is false, or not confirmable.  
(6) Politics. Politics is a sector that indirectly influences GER 
SOF. This environmental sector can be considered relatively stable but complex. GER 
SOF is of special interest to the German government. In contrast to Germany’s General 
Purpose Forces, GER SOF are emphasized because of the importance of their missions. 
The media, with its ability to pressure politicians, often influence them to act. The 
politicians often turn to GER SOF because of their flexibility and responsiveness. 
Examples include some early missions in the Balkans, operations in Afghanistan or 
Africa. 
(7) Information Operations and Media. This important 
environmental sector is considered complex yet unstable. As a matter of fact, many 
different types of media such as newspapers, (online) journals, Internet, cell-phones, TV 
or radio broadcasting make this sector very complex. Media has the capability to 
influence people and politicians immediately and at global range. But reactions to 
received information differ among people around the globe due different personalities, 
knowledge, or culture of people. Public reactions are often not predictable. Thus, this 
sector can be seen as very unstable. GER SOF depends on media. For example, positive 
publications about GER SOF can support recruitment and better understanding of SOF 
missions. Negative publications about GER SOF can lead to long-lasting internal 
investigations that may hinder GER SOF’s effectiveness despite possible incorrectness of 
such publications. 
(8) Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS). 
This environmental sector is considered stable but complex. The Bundeswehr and 
external resources, as with certain development institutes or industries, do not often 
change. However, in contrast to GPF, SOF cooperate with a large number of different 
organizations. As previously mentioned, even within the Bundeswehr, GER SOF need to 
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cooperate with and sometimes rely on other services and branches. In addition, GER SOF 
has close relationships with Special Forces of partner nations, police units and the civil 
sector. Thus, this sector can be viewed as very complex. 
(9) Finance. This sector is considered stable and simple. The 
money flow is transparent because of political guidelines and remains the same over the 
years. 
(10) Chain of Command. This environmental sector is also 
considered stable and, even if fragmented in some cases, simple because of the inherent 
structure of the Bundeswehr. 
(11) Technology. This environmental sector is considered 
highly unstable and complex. Technology changes quickly, which is true for new 
technological developments, as well as changes in the enemy’s techniques, tactics and 
procedures (TTPs). These elements change rapidly. Thus, one of the biggest challenges 
for SOF is always to be at the forefront of such developments to cope with the latest 
threats. 
(12) Socio-Cultural-Sector. This sector has an indirect as well as 
a direct influence on GER SOF. In the long term, this sector can shape the behavior of the 
GER SOF’s entire environment, as well as GER SOF itself. The direct influence can be 
seen in the willingness of other organizations or people to support SOF. As long as 
resources, the media and politics are stable, the Socio-Cultural-Sector remains stable. 
However, this environmental sector can be considered complex because of the highly 
diverse external organizations that influence GER SOF with which it must cope. 
(13) Human Sector. This environmental sector is considered 
stable and simple. It encompasses the direct human involvement in GER SOF (chain of 
command, selection process, operators, families, people of other services and so forth). 
As long as a rather common understanding exists of what SOF are and what tasks they 
perform, changes to their mindset are not routinely expected.  
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c. Environmental Sectors of GER SOF—Findings and Assessment 
In the next step, the categorized environmental sectors from the previous 
section are combined. Figure 8 clusters the findings in a model based on Mintzberg’s 
model.  
 
Figure 8.  Scatterplot of Findings. 
Figure 8 shows that most of the GER SOF’s environmental sectors are 
complex. Indeed, this complex environment contains the most influential sectors, such as 
the GER SOF’s missions worldwide, intelligence networks, training, technology and 
Information Operations that all contribute to the mission’s success. Recall that a complex 
environment requires decentralization.  
 57
GER SOF’s environment can be divided into a stable and complex 
environment as well as an unstable and complex environment (Figure 8). According to 
Mintzberg, the most effective configuration for a stable, yet complex, environment is a 
“Professional Bureaucracy.”120 
Most important, because it [Professional Bureaucracy] relies for its 
operating tasks on trained professionals—skilled people who must be 
given considerable control over their own work—the organization 
surrenders a good deal of its power not only to the professionals 
themselves but also to the associations and institutions that select and train 
them in the first place. As a result, the structure emerges as very 
decentralized; power over many decisions, both operating and strategic, 
flows all the way down the hierarchy to the professionals of the operating 
core. […] Complexity requires that decision-making power be 
decentralized to highly trained individuals, and stability enables these 
individuals to apply standardized skills and so to work with a good deal of 
autonomy.121 
Figure 8 also shows that many of GER SOF’s important environmental 
sectors are unstable and complex. The downside of a professional bureaucracy is its 
inability to adopt and innovate, which is exactly what is needed to cope with challenges 
in an unstable yet complex environment. The configuration that fits this sector best is a 
design in which project teams are able to interact. Such a configuration is called an 
“adhocracy.”122 
Indeed, adhocracy contradicts much of what we accept on faith in 
organizations – constancy in output, control by administrators, unity of 
command, strategy emanating from the top. It is a tremendously fluid 
structure, in which power is constantly shifting and coordination and 
control are by mutual adjustment through the informal communication and 
interaction of competent experts.123 
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Such an adhocracy is a configuration in which trained and specialized 
experts work together to be innovative rather than becoming experts with near-perfect 
skills in their own narrow fields. Contrary to a conventional structure “with power based 
on expertise instead of authority, the line/staff distinction evaporates. And with power 
distributed throughout the structure, the distinction between the strategic apex and the 
rest of the structure blurs.”124 
In assessing the findings, it can be stated that the configuration of GER 
SOF should be a combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy to fit its 
principal environment best. The few environmental sectors that can be found in the 
simple parts of the cluster in Figure 8 do not have the same impact as those in the 
complex quadrants (e.g., authority can be shifted). Thus, they are not negligible but 
should not affect GER SOF’s configuration to the same degree as the others. 
d. Analysis of the Structure of German Special Operations Forces 
“The structure of the organization determines the placement of power and 
authority in the organization.”125 The following analysis of the structure of GER SOF 
should reveal which kind of configuration GER SOF possesses. As long as the Army’s 
KSK and Navy’s KS are structured in the same way (Figures 2 and 3), this analysis 
applies to both units. However, the main focus has been on the Army’s KSK because of 
its manning and size (approximately 1300 soldiers) compared to its naval sister unit 
(approximately 60 sailors). 
To examine the structure of GER SOF, elements of an organizational 
structure126 such as departmentalization, formalization, centralization, complexity and 
span of control are analyzed. 
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(1) Departmentalization. “Departmentalization specifies how 
employees and their activities are grouped together. It is a fundamental strategy for 
coordinating organizational activities.”127 Departmentalization influences organizational 
behavior through the established chain of command; it “focuses people around common 
mental models or ways of thinking,” and it “encourages coordination through informal 
communication among people and subunits.”128  
For example, the German Army is designed as a divisional 
structure that focuses on rapid deployment for certain kinds of missions, such as those 
that require quick intervention for a secure return of German citizens, or long-term 
stabilizing missions.129 However, the Division of Fast Forces as one out of three 
divisions consists of an airborne brigade, the KSK, and three helicopter regiments. The 
division of fast forces focuses on functional specialization (skills) rather than mission-
types or regions. Thus, the division of fast forces is functionally structured- 
A functional structure is a layout of well-defined departments 
based on functional specialization. In this structure, the information flow tends to follow 
the hierarchy. Additionally, this structure clearly distinguishes between line and staff.130 
Focusing only on the KSK, it is clearly divided into four major parts: staff section, 
mission section, support section and development section. These four sections are 
subordinate to the commander of the KSK, a Brigadier General. As shown in Figure 6, 
this section is also structured functionally. First, the staff is divided into its parts, such as 
personnel, intelligence and security, operations, support, communications, medical 
support and special support. Second, the mission section is divided into four fighting 
companies, one combat support company and the training section. The support section is 
divided into the communication company, a support company, a medical center and a 
maintenance company. The development section is also divided into functions. 
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According to Thompson’s three types of interdependence, the task (or workflow) 
interdependence is pooled.131 Sequential, or even reciprocal interdependence, only occurs 
because of personal connections.132 However, the only established horizontal link of 
Daft’s ladder133 of mechanisms for horizontal linkage and coordination between all these 
elements is an internal information system and direct (personal) contact. The information 
system consists of normal phone and computer network systems (email, Internal 
Webpages). 
(2) Formalization. Formalization is the degree to which 
organizations standardize behavior through rules, procedures, formal training and related 
mechanisms.134 The KSK as well as the KS, which are deeply integrated into the 
Bundeswehr are as highly formalized as any military organization. Each soldier has a 
duty-description that precisely defines what duties the soldier must perform in his “slot.” 
Standard Operating Procedures, rulebooks and written orders precisely define how the 
soldiers do their tasks. Even for the SOF units, room barely exists to improvise and for 
flexible tasks to be performed. Thus, GER SOF are an organization that focuses on work 
processes and consequently need a great deal of administration (“techno-staff”) support.   
(3) Centralization. “Centralization is the degree to which 
formal authority to make discretionary choices are concentrated in an individual, unit or 
level.”135 It can be measured in “[…] how much direct involvement top managers have in 
gathering and interpreting the information they use in decision making and the degree to 
which top management directly controls the execution of a decision.”136 Authority within 
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the Army’s KSK strictly follows the lines of the organizational chart displayed in Figure 
2. The KSK is not an exception to the strict hierarchy within the whole armed forces. 
This is also true for the Navy’s KS (Figure 3). Thus, only limited vertical decentralization 
exists. 
(4) Complexity. “Complexity refers to both the number of 
levels in the hierarchy (vertical complexity) and the number of departments or jobs 
(horizontal complexity).”137 The vertical differentiation as “the number of hierarchical 
levels between top management and the bottom” can be seen as high. The chain of 














    
  
  







        
Figure 9.  Chain of Command. 
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To task such a mission element, at least six (in the case of the 
Army’s KSK, seven) hierarchical levels and orders must pass from the very top down 
until it reaches the execution element, which is also true for requests from bottom up. 
Thus, the vertical differentiation is considered as high. In addition, the horizontal 
differentiation of KS and KSK is also considered as high because of many different 
requirements on specializations (compare single combat actions and task environment of 
GER SOF). Especially up to the company level, “jobs” are very different, special and 
require a high level of skills. Thus, in the entire organization, quite a bit of vertical and 
horizontal specialization exists.  
(5) Span of Control. “Span of control refers to the number of 
people directly reporting to the next level in the hierarchy.”138 Looking at Figure 9, the 
KSK itself and the surrounding Army can be seen as a tall organization, and this is 
reflected in its relatively narrow span of control. The span of control varies from four 
(teams in a commando platoon) to six (companies in the mission section) and seven 
(brigades/regiments in the Division of Fast Forces of the Army). With one decision level 
less than its Army counterpart, the Navy’s KS face a nearly similar span of control. 
e. The Structure of German Special Forces—Findings and 
Assessment 
What kind of configuration does GER SOF have? From the previous 
section, recall that the GER SOF’s configuration is functionally structured with only 
limited horizontal linkages between its departments. The task flow and workflow can be 
seen as a pooled interdependence. As in other parts of the military, GER SOF are highly 
formalized and focused on work processes, which are created and maintained by a large 
“techno staff.” Further, the GER SOF are highly centralized with a strict hierarchy and 
only limited horizontal decentralization. Lastly, GER SOF are considered to possess 
horizontal and vertical specialization but only has a narrow span of control. 
A mechanistic structure is characterized by a narrow span of control and a 
high degree of formalization and centralization. Mechanistic structures 
have many rules and procedures, limited decision making at lower levels, 
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tall hierarchies of people in specialized roles, and vertical rather than 
horizontal communication flows. Tasks are rigidly defined and are altered 
only when sanctioned by higher authorities.139 
In assessing the findings of the structural analysis of GER SOF, it can be 
concluded that the current configuration, according to Henry Mintzberg, a “Machine 
Bureaucracy” because it fulfills nearly all its criteria.140 Recalling Figure 6, a machine 
bureaucracy is the best fit for a stable but simple environment that does not face much 
uncertainty. 
f. GER SOF’s Current Structural Configuration 
The findings of GER SOF’s environmental sectors (Table 8) reveal that 
most are placed in a complex environment. Moreover, the most influencing sectors, such 
as missions worldwide, technology, intelligence networks and information operations and 
media are categorized as complex and unstable. Also, this sector is labeled as having the 
highest uncertainty. In assessing the GER SOF’s environment, it can be concluded that a 
combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy would be the best fit to cope 
with GER SOF’s challenges. However, the analysis and assessment of GER SOF’s 
current structure revealed that the dominant configuration of German Special Forces is a 
machine bureaucracy; it fulfills most of Mintzberg’s criteria for such an organizational 
configuration.  
According to David Hannah, an environmental misfit occurs if the 
organization becomes better, and better at what it is doing, as a result of ignoring the 
environment.141 By using Mintzberg’s theory, the analysis reveals that GER SOF’s 
environment requires a combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy rather 
than a machine bureaucracy. However, the structure of GER SOF is exactly the opposite. 
It is a machine bureaucracy that is the best fit for a stable and simple environment 
without much uncertainty. 
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g. Evaluation of the Fit of GER SOF’s Configuration 
An organization fits if the conditions of “all organizational elements are 
congruent with the intended results.”142 Two sub-conditions are important. First, an 
internal fit is required, as well as the coherence of the subsystems with each other. 
Second, an environmental fit is also required. GER SOF as a living open system interacts 
with its environment permanently. Our task was to test whether GER SOF meet the 
structural requirements of its environment. The analysis shows that GER SOF’s 
environment requires a combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy, but 
GER SOF’s structure clearly reveals its design as a machine bureaucracy, according to 
Mintzberg’s theory. Even without looking at the purpose of the system, this analysis and 
assessment leads to the conclusion that the current organizational design of GER SOF 
does not fit its environmental requirements. Thus, it is strongly assumed that a gap exists 
between Deduction 5 and GER SOF’s current capability to conduct professional time-
sensitive contingency missions. 
D. FINDINGS 
This chapter was dedicated to comparing previously drawn deductions with GER 
SOF’s current situation by doing a defense mission analysis. The findings show that 
significant gaps exist between German political demands and capabilities of GER SOF to 
fulfill such demands. That answers the initially stated hypothesis. In short, the following 
gaps exist (Table 9). 
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Deduction 1: German Special Operations Forces must be properly manned, equipped 
and resourced to fulfill requirements of NATO, EU, international conflict prevention and 
crisis management, and for evacuation and hostage rescue operations at the same time to 
meet current political demands. 
GER SOF is undermanned. With its four Army SOF companies, one NAVY SOF 
company and marginal organic support units, GER SOF cannot continuously support four 
required missions. 
 
Deduction 2: GER SOF must be commanded and controlled at a strategic level with a 
clear and unambiguous chain of command that possess sufficient experience and 
expertise to plan, conduct and support special operations.  
GER SOF’s command and control is barely integrated at the strategic level. Its leadership 
is fragmented and not sufficiently SOF experienced in special operations. 
 
Deduction 3: GER SOF must have the capability to function in a warrior-diplomat role 
over the long run to support an indirect strategic approach.  
GER SOF’s training only focuses on SOF’s commando role; gaps exist in GER SOF’s 
warrior diplomat role. Also see Deduction 1. 
Deduction 4: National-level intelligence must be provided to GER SOF. GER SOF also 
must have organic capabilities for special reconnaissance and political and strategic 
intelligence to conduct strategic quick-response operations. 
GER SOF’s training focuses primarily on Direct Action. There is no SO dedicated for 
Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Human Intelligence or other Intelligence. 
 
Deduction 5: As a strategic tool, GER SOF must be capable of conducting time-sensitive 
missions glabally.  
According to Mintzberg’s theory, GER SOF’s current configuration does not support 
contingency missions that require inter-agency, inter-service and inner-service 
cooperation. 
 
Deduction 6: GER SOF must use advanced technologies to create advantages over their 
enemies.  
The acquisition-process for GER SOF is the same as for general purpose forces and 
therefore too slow to aquire up-to-date technologies. 
 
Deduction 7: GER SOF must be able to conduct immediate information operations to 
undermine enemy capabilities and advantages.  




Deduction 8: GER SOF must achieve operations security (OPSEC) to protect 
information regarding own intentions and missions. 
The Army’s KSK, as the only military unit specially assigned for sensitive hostage rescue 
operations, is located in a small base in Calw without secure access to operational 
military railroad or airport facilities. The base can be observed from at least three sides. 
In addition, rotating attached conventional units for support maybe create additional 
security-vulnerabilities. 
 
Deduction 9: GER SOF must start planning to conduct military operations against WMD 
proliferation. 
No current tasks or guidelines exist to counter the proliferation of WMD. 
 
Deduction 10: GER SOF should consider options to respond militarily to cyber attacks.  
No current tasks or guidelines exist to counter cyber attacks. 
 
Deduction 11: 
Capable personnel for GER SOF, including supporters and leadership, shall be carefully 
selected. 
SOF selection is only applicable to operators not for all personnel within GER SOF. 
 
Deduction 12: 
Adequate combat support and combat service support is necessary.  
GER SOF lack adequate Combat Support and Combat Service Support. 
Table 9.   Defense Mission Analysis—Findings. 
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IV. HOW TO ACHIEVE GREATER INTERNAL COHERENCE 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS FOR CURRENT AND 
FUTURE MISSIONS 
This chapter is dedicated to presenting recommendations based on the findings in 
this study. Closing existing gaps between political demands and expectations of GER 
SOF, and GER SOF’s current capabilities through an adaptive reorganization of GER 
SOF is needed. GER SOF, as part of the Bundeswehr, must reorganize “to meet current 
tasks and expected future developments,”143 as the Federal Minister of Defense 
demanded in his 2011 guidelines. In doing so, this chapter draws conclusions from 
deductions and findings as a basis for recommendations on how German Special Forces 
can adapt and reorganize. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
For the GER SOF, there is much room for improvement. However, first and 
foremost, the need for such improvements must be acknowledged. That requires an 
understanding of SOF and their strategic utility, and also the willingness to support 
special operations. Therefore, “elite” should not be a negatively loaded term in regard to 
special forces; jealousy must never be a factor among military decision-makers. All 
German military forces serve the national defense. 
1. Recommendation R1 
GER SOF shall increase its force strength to reflect MOD’s level of ambition to 
respond to routine challenges and contingency operations. In doing so, GER SOF should 
first divide its forces into elements designated for routine missions and elements that 
remain ready for contingency operations. This will ensure sustained, uninterrupted 
mission execution and readiness. Second, each element designated for missions (ME) 
shall be manned and equipped to meet MOD’s Level of Ambition (LoA) of four 
simultaneous and protracted SOF missions. Deployment cycles of those ME shall account 
                                                 
143. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense. “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry 
of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 8. 
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for the need for further education and training, maintenance of equipment, required tests 
for readiness, healthcare and recreation. The exact numbers of personnel cannot be 
recommended because of classified internal data of GER SOF. This task needs further 
internal analysis. 
2. Recommendation R2 
GER SOF’s command and control needs adaptation at all echelons. At the 
strategic level, GER SOF need an element that is authorized to issue directives to all SOF 
units and to all services in cases of national crises management. This element also shall 
coordinate issues at the political/strategic level and advise Germany’s Chief of Defense. 
At the operational level, GER SOF shall establish a German Special Operations 
Command (GER SOCOM). All SOF units shall be taken out of current service and 
commands, and united under the new GER SOCOM. Its chief shall be responsible for 
daily, routine SOF operations. GER SOCOM also needs close links to other services for 
better coordination. At the tactical level, mission elements have to be clearly assigned to 
a mission commander. Unit deployment rotation schedules should be synchronized for a 
better internal coherence and to build trust within deploying units. Support units of other 
services must be designated to support GER SOF primarily. This will contribute to a 
“clear and unambiguous chain of command.” Furthermore, SOF leadership at all levels 
must be fully qualified to plan, execute, and support special operations. 
3. Recommendation R3 
GER SOF shall set up an organic ability to conduct military assistance; GER SOF 
shall enhance their capabilities to operate in the warrior-diplomat role. At a minimum, 
this includes training in languages related to target areas, indigenous social and cultural 
orientations and regional studies, human intelligence operations and psychological 
warfare. Manning requirements for such a unit may exceed others because of the political 
requirements for stability operations and protracted deployments that are necessary to 
build trust with host nation partners. Further considerations are needed to determine the 
number of personnel required for these units. 
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4. Recommendation R4 
Specific recommendations regarding support of national-level intelligence efforts 
cannot really be made because of the absence of unclassified data. However, GER SOF 
needs adequate intelligence support. GER SOF’s Intelligence shall also be inter-service 
and inner-service connected. To achieve synergetic effects, GER SOF shall unite 
intelligence persons in one unit that will support GER SOF’s intelligence staff cell. The 
intelligence unit shall contain strategic and operational intelligence-collectors and 
maintain Intel-networks. This unit shall also be responsible for supporting deployed units 
with standing non-deployable teams in the rear. Furthermore, GER SOF shall set up a 
separate SR unit that comprises all techniques for tactical surveillance and 
reconnaissance. As an example, the unit shall include human intelligence teams and 
female reconnaissance, search, and interrogator teams. 
5. Recommendation R5 
GER SOF requires an organizational design that combines elements of an 
adhocracy and professional bureaucracy, according to Mintzberg’s theory. Such an 
organizational design shall have the following characteristics. It shall be designed with 
low vertical differentiation and hence have a flat chain of command and allow reciprocal 
interdependence between units for a quick and smooth information flow. Authority shall 
be based on expertise rather than on rank, but at the same time, the organizational design 
shall support a clear chain of command (R2). Vertical and horizontal decentralization 
shall be a characteristic of such a configuration. The design further shall support in-depth 
knowledge of many different skills but also adapt quickly to uncertain and unstable 
organizational environments. Access to required capabilities on short notice is 
fundamental for contingency missions. This access is only possible if one “owns” such 
units. Required capabilities thus shall be organically established and functionally 
organized. Mission elements shall be able to cope with the challenges of missions around 
the globe, including different environments and weather, as well as quick deployments at 
global range. 
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6. Recommendation R6 
GER SOF shall establish an accelerated acquisition process to develop and 
introduce new technologies and systems. Existing systems and equipment of the 
Bundeswehr shall be prioritized to support SOF, if required. Procurement of market-
available technologies and systems—not currently existent in the Bundeswehr—shall not 
exceed the length of deployment (six months) to be useful. GER SOF shall also have 
their own budget, independent from other services, to serve their own needs. 
7. Recommendation R7 
GER SOF shall establish organic capabilities to support four separate missions 
with information operations. Such IO must be closely coordinated with intelligence and 
analysts measuring IO effectiveness to achieve results. Hence, IO skills and capabilities 
shall be integrated in to the Intelligence unit. 
8. Recommendation R8 
GER SOF’s units shall be based on larger bases with access to air, land, or sea 
ports. Operations security can be better achieved if military traffic, exercises or even 
personal identities become blurred with other military appearances and patterns. In 
conjunction with R5, fewer attached external support units and a separate chain of 
command will also contribute to better OPSEC. 
9. Recommendation R9 
GER SOF shall be tasked to start planning to counter the proliferation of WMD. 
Such considerations require further analysis. 
10. Recommendation R10 
GER SOF shall be tasked to start planning to respond militarily against cyber 
attacks. This, too, requires further analysis. 
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11. Recommendation R11 
GER SOF shall select all personnel to ensure common mindset and goals as well 
as required skills and personal characteristics. Selection shall be adapted to respective 
tasks within GER SOF because job profiles differ. The chief of a functional unit together 
with a selection board shall be responsible to select new candidates. Furthermore, they 
shall also be empowered to de-select personnel if they do not fit into the team. 
12. Recommendation R12 
GER SOF shall be adequately supported with organic combat support (CS) and 
combat service support (CSS). Combat Support includes specialized infantry. CS and 
CSS shall appear as separate units, which are able to support four separate missions and 
daily duty in the rear simultaneously. 
B. ADAPTIVE REORGANIZATION OF GER SOF 
The point of departure for an adaptive reorganization of German Special 
Operations Forces is the finding that GER SOF should be designed as a mix of a 
professional bureaucracy and adhocracy in order to deal with GER SOF’s almost 
uncertain organizational environment, according to Mintzberg’s configurational theory 
(R5). Figure 10 displays an attempt to incorporate the findings that affect GER SOF’s 
configurational design.  
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Figure 10.  Proposal for A New German SOF Structure. 
A mix of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy does have some 
characteristics in common. First, both configurations are designed to cope with 
complexity “that requires that decision-making power be decentralized to highly trained 
individuals,” as previously mentioned. In other words, it requires a delegation of power 
down the chain of authority (vertical decentralization), and from traditional decision-
makers to experts (horizontal decentralization). With the focus on the tactical and 
operational levels, GER SOF shall be able to assemble forces for missions in which 
leadership can be shifted immediately between trained and skilled specialists to cope with 
the current task. But adhocracy and professional bureaucracy also require highly trained 
personnel for the full variety of “jobs.” A functional structure enables indepth knowledge 
and skills.144 Thus, for training purposes and daily business, GER SOF need to be 
                                                 
144. Burton and Obel, “Lectures in Organizational Design.” 
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divided into separate functions. Combined, GER SOF shall establish a matrix form that 
incorporates advantages from a functional structure but also a task-oriented one. In detail, 
GER SOF shall set up different units with required core tasks. These are Direct Action, 
Military Assistance (R3), Special Reconnaissance (R4), Information Operations (R7), Air 
and Boat Support, Combat Support, Combat Service Support (R12), but also a Training 
Wing, development group and staff. All of these units shall be able to provide elements 
for four separate task forces for continuous operations (R1). The Training Wing 
analogously shall be able to prepare four separate missions and task forces. All 
deployable functional units (ME) shall be capable of operating under various geographic 
and weather conditions (R5). However, such operations shall be integrated within 
functional units, especially in DA and SR. Traditional environmental differentiations 
such as desert, air, water and jungle, mountain and arctic terrain for different tactics and 
techniques shall remain the responsibility of ME. During missions, Staff, Intel/ IO unit, 
and Combat Service Support shall facilitate mission continuity to avoid interruptions due 
to rotating task forces. The Training Wing and Research and Development Group (R&D 
Group) are normally not assigned for missions. 
Command and Control is closely bound up with GER SOF’s structure (see Figure 
5). GER SOF’s C2 shall meet R2. At the political/strategic level, a SOF adviser cell shall 
be established and directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense while the small cell SE I 5 
(Figure 1) shall be terminated. This cell (here called Special Operations Advisor and 
Coordination Cell, SOFADCC), should advise the Chief of Defense but also the Chief’s 
Directorate-Generals for planning, forces policy, and strategy and operations regarding 
SOF. It also shall be responsible to coordinate SOF issues with other Directorate-
Generals and departments. It shall prepare directives to GER SOF’s operational 
command but also to other operational commands in cases of national crisis management. 
However, only the Chief of Defense can issue directives to his subordinate commands 
(black line, Figure 10). The cell should establish a close connection to GER SOCOM 
(broken red line, Figure 10). Such a SOF adviser cell would contribute to SOF’s strategic 
implementation, strategic command and control and vertical linkage. Furthermore, the 
implementation would serve as direct contact for all Directorate-Generals and other 
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ministerial departments, which contributes to better horizontal linkages and reciprocal 
interdependence. 
At the operational level, GER SOF shall become its own service. The new 
established GER SOCOM shall command and control GER SOF’s missions. In doing so, 
the KdoFOSK, as well as currently existing SOF staff of the Army’s and Navy’s KSK, 
shall shift from Operations Command to GER SOCOM. These different staffs shall 
merge into one joint SOF staff. Raising GER SOF to a service level with a SOF chief 
equivalent to other service chiefs will provide further advantages. As a separate service, 
GER SOF will have a voice within the Chief of Defense’s military leadership council 
(MFR) at the strategic and operational level. As a service with organic support, GER SOF 
can also operate almost independently from other services. Authority and capability thus 
remain within the SOF service and is not fragmented, which contributes to R2. 
Furthermore, an independent service better fits David Tucker’s and Christopher Lamb’s 
conclusion that “SOF provide greater strategic value […] when SOF perform in an 
independent role.”145 Designed, trained and led to conduct special operations, GER SOF 
may be more “suited for denied and politically sensitive environments,”146 rather than the 
current solutions using a mix of SOF and GPF. However, some support for special 
operations requires close coordination with other services. Thus, SOF liaison elements 
(LE) shall be sent to staffs of other services to contribute to better horizontal coordination 
(red line to LE, Figure 10). Liaison elements contribute to R5’s demand for reciprocal 
interdependence. Once assigned to support special operations, the authority over units 
from other services shall immediately shift to GER SOCOM. That also reduces 
fragmented command and control. 
At the tactical level, the Army and Navy SOF units shall be combined and 
commanded under GER SOCOM SOF only. This new, recommended structure is flat, 
which also means a flat chain of command for a faster information flow yet a wider span 
of control. The recommended design for GER SOF at the tactical level is a matrix form 
that combines the advantages from functional and task-oriented structures. That creates a 
                                                 
145. Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, 158. 
146. USSOCOM, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 Special Operations, April 18, 2011. 
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dual chain of command. For mission purposes, elements of these units shall be assembled 
as a task force (TF). If possible, elements of all functional units shall be firmly assigned 
to certain standing task forces for ongoing missions, headed by a designated task force 
commander (red lines, Figure 10). Their TF Commanders shall be responsible for their 
task forces during deployment but also back home for mission preparation, lessons 
learned and team-building. During missions, TF Commander shall delegate authority to 
experts to conduct selected combat actions. The TF Commander functions as the 
coordinator who keeps the mission running. Commanders of functional units shall be 
responsible to provide TF commanders with the required capabilities (people and 
material). When not deployed, units stay at home and remain under functional command. 
For contingency missions, functional units shall provide required assets on short notice. 
The underlying mindset of all units shall be to prioritize support for any given mission 
first.  
C. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Resources are always scarce, especially when it comes to expensive air and boat 
assets. The Bundeswehr might not be able to afford additional helicopters, airplanes and 
boats exclusively for German Special Operations Forces—even if such a solution would 
be the best for GER SOF. Similar to the recommended new structure of GER SOF, 
helicopters, air planes and bigger boats shall be “owned” by other services (like 
functional units) for efficiency reasons and to avoid expensive doubling of capabilities. 
However, air and boat support must meet GER SOF requirements and standards to be 
useful. If requested, these units shall primarily support Special Operations Forces because 
of their strategic impact. 
Further considerations shall concern GER SOF’s reward system. How can GER 
SOF motivate non-operators to join the service? Why should they bear the burden to keep 
up with SOF’s high requirements but not being an operator? GER SOF’s supporters are 
not selected. But “a chain is as strong as its weakest link,” the saying goes. In other 
words, the best operators can fail, if they are not properly supported. Materialistically 
motivated supporters are not preferable for SOF. However, immaterial rewards serve as 
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better motivation than materialistic rewards. But there is no immaterial or material 




The focus of this thesis was to develop recommendations for an adaptive 
reorganization of GER SOF to achieve greater internal coherence and thus greater 
organizational effectiveness for current and future missions. It was based on the 
assumption that gaps exist between political demands and expectations of German 
Special Operations Forces, and the capabilities of GER SOF to fulfill such demands. This 
thesis is an approach to answer the questions: “What is wanted?” “What do we have 
already?” and thus “What is needed?” 
As described in Chapter I, “small wars” are not always fought in support of “big 
wars” anymore. Small wars nowadays can quickly become issues at the political level 
with strategic impact. Special Operations Forces are considered to be a strategic tool to 
counter such irregular threats. As such a tool, the German military’s Special Operations 
Forces (the Army’s KSK) were founded in 1996 after the events in Rwanda 1994. In 
2005, Navy’s Kampfschwimmer also achieved the status of Special Operations Forces 
with similar tasks. Some years later, the 2006 German Defense White Paper  and the 
German Defense Guidelines of 2011 set the stage for the Bundeswehr’s transformation to 
cope with current and future challenges. However, despite the general view of GER SOF 
as a strategic asset and the major changes within the Bundeswehr in 2012, German SOF 
units remained in their services of Army and Navy. A conventional HQ still controls 
GER SOF’s missions abroad with a subordinate SOF HQ (KdoFOSK). 
Official papers state what is required from German Special Operations Forces. 
But what does it mean? The defense mission analysis of the German official guidelines 
and additional NATO papers that also affect GER SOF reveal assumptions about how 
GER SOF should be. In short, GER SOF are supposed to meet the following criteria: 
 execute four simultaneous, protracted missions 
 be commanded and controlled with a clear and unambiguous chain of 
command composed of experienced personnel 
 function in a warrior-diplomat role to conduct military assistance (in 
addition to DA missions) 
 78
 possess adequate, organic intelligence capabilities 
 conduct time-sensitive contingency missions at global range 
 possess advanced technology 
 possess capabilities to conduct immediate information operations 
 ensure operations security 
 plan to counter proliferation of WMD,  and react to cyber attacks 
 select SOF personnel according to their designated roles 
 possess adequate combat support and combat service support 
These deductions then were set beside GER SOF’s current capabilities. The 
findings reveal that GER SOF’s current capabilities do not meet these demands and 
expectations. Hence, gaps exist between German political demands and the capabilities of 
German Special Operations Forces to meet such demands. Findings also reveal that the 
current organizational design is not congruent with the mission and goals for GER SOF. 
Deeply integrated into their respective services, GER SOF rather look like a tool to 
support conventional forces and operations rather than a highly strategic tool with an 
independent role. GER SOF is trapped in a configurational design of a machine 
bureaucracy, and not organizationally designed to deal with uncertainty and complexity. 
Thus, German missions similar to U.S. Desert One can face the same destiny, for all the 
same reasons. In all circumstances, such self-made disasters must be prevented.  
The question then is, how can German Special Operations Forces achieve greater 
internal coherence and thus greater organizational effectiveness for current and future 
missions? All the recommendations made here were based on findings in order to 
demonstrate previously drawn deductions. In a second step, recommendations regarding 
GER SOF structure and command and control are incorporated in a new configurational 
design according to organizational theories. This is designated to inform the new SOF 
structure within the Bundeswehr. 
Fundamentally, new in this proposal is the implementation of a SOF cell at the 
strategic level. This cell coordinates SOF-related issues at strategic level and advises the 
Chief of Defense regarding SOF. Also, GER SOF shall become its own service with its 
own command that fully commands GER SOF. It shall be very closely linked to other 
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services and commands for better coordination. GER SOF shall merge Army and Navy 
SOF units. Manning and equipment shall meet the Level of Ambition. New capabilities 
in military assistance, special reconnaissance, information operations and human 
intelligence shall be established. GER SOF shall also establish their own support units for 
operations. The acquisition and procurement process shall be modified to quickly acquire 
new technologies and equipment. If not organically inherent in SOF, additional support 
for SOF shall be prioritized. GER SOCOM shall be located as close as possible to the 
strategic echelon. SOF leadership must be specially trained and selected. All personnel 
serving in SOF have to be selected according to their designated positions. An 
organizational matrix form for GER SOF is recommended. Functional arrangements shall 
ensure in-depth knowledge regarding sub-tasks and environmental concerns. Any Task 
Force assembled from these functional units will be tailored to the mission, well trained, 
quickly deployable, and adequately supported. 
Furthermore, planning must be conducted to prevent the proliferation of WMD, 
and cyber attacks. Concerning adequate personnel for GER SOF, the current reward 
system shall be reviewed. 
There are many more topics regarding GER SOF that might be investigated in the 
future. It might be appropriate, for example, to unite GER SOF with the GSG9 in order to 
avoid duplication of capabilities. That possibility requires consideration about the use of 
(military) SOF within Germany. Also, the possible implementation of a national crisis 
cell or a Department of Security Policy under the direct command of the German Federal 
Chancellor might be worth considering.  
The proposed structure recommended by this thesis for an adaptive reorganization 
of GER SOF might challenge the personal attitudes of some high-ranking officers 
because some of them will lose their command and influence over their best soldiers. The 
response to this resistance must be that current and future threats have come to the 
doorstep of the GER SOF. Accordingly, GER SOF must be prepared to meet this threat. 
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